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Cities started the unprecedented growth about one hundred years ago.  Their 
importance and significance are reflected by their high productivities and spatial 
concentrations.  The understanding on urban development would help improve urban 
management and policies and increase wellbeing of urban residents.  The three 
related essays in this dissertation try to improve the understanding from the 
perspectives of employment centers and agglomeration economies, interactions 
between labor and housing markets, and the behavior of local governments. 
The first essay examines the role of employment centers on economic 
development.  The theoretical literature suggests that agglomeration economies are 
the main force behind the formation and evolution of employment centers, as well as 
behind economic growth in general.  Applying the birth model to employment centers 
in Maryland, I find agglomeration effects are increased by the centers, particularly 
those with high employment size or industrial diversity.  Ignoring employment 
  
centers may overestimate the agglomeration effects when using the fixed distance 
measurement.  Policy implications are local officials may use employment centers as 
a vehicle to promote economic growth. 
In the second essay I test the impact of job loss on housing foreclosures.  A 
great challenge in this study, as well as in interactions between labor and housing 
markets in general, is the geographic mismatch between employment and residential 
locations.  This partially explains the mixed effects of job loss on foreclosures found 
in the literature.  In order to gauge this effect, I develop a job loss vulnerability index 
using home-work commuting pairs.  After fixing the attenuation bias from 
measurement errors, I find that job loss plays an important role in foreclosure 
decisions.  This essay provides evidence for impact from labor market bust to housing 
market depression. 
The third essay estimates the spending pattern of off-budget revenues.  The 
literature assumes different spending preferences of budgetary and off-budget 
revenues, but empirical evidence are scarce due to the lack of off-budget data.  I use 
land revenues to proxy off-budget revenues in Chinese cities.  I find that off-budget 
revenues do not crowd out budgetary expenditures, and they tend to support visible 
and tangible projects, rather than some other traditional public spending items that are 
































Dissertation submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School of the  
University of Maryland, College Park, in partial fulfillment 
of the requirements for the degree of 












Associate Professor Chengri Ding, Chair 
Dr. James R. Cohen 
Professor Gerrit J. Knaap 
Professor Erik Lichtenberg 
Professor Lori Lynch 











































The most important support, guidance and help I have received at Maryland 
come from my advisor, Professor Chengri Ding.  He has spent so much time and 
efforts on my academic trainings, including which techniques to learn by choosing 
classes, how to solve research questions, how to see big pictures, how to generate and 
evaluate research ideas, etc.  He pointed out many problems in my work and study 
that I never realized by myself, so that I could get improved by solving these 
problems one by one.  What I learnt from him also include the attitude to my work, 
career, and other people.  Without his advice I could not make most of the progress 
that I have made during the past four years and a half. 
I wish to thank other faculty members who also gave me help at Maryland.  
Professor Gerrit Knaap directs the National Center for Smart Growth, where I have 
been working as a Research Assistant and got plentiful data for two of my three 
dissertation essays.  He served in my dissertation committee and provided many good 
suggestions.  The discussions with another committee member, Professor Erik 
Lichtenberg, as well as his questions in my proposal defense and dissertation defense, 
helped me grow.  My other committee members, Professor Charles Towe, Professor 
Lori Lynch and Dr. James Cohen all offered valuable comments on my dissertation 
researches.  My three econometric classes taught by Professor Richard Just, Professor 
Anna Alberini, and Professor Raymond Guiteras covered many crucial empirical 
skills I applied in my dissertation. 
I also benefited from communications with my colleagues and friends.  Selma 




dissertation and generously offered suggestions.  Discussions with Fanqing Ye helped 
me improve my papers and presentations.  I am grateful to Aviva Brown, Rebecca 








Table of Contents ......................................................................................................... iii 
List of Tables ................................................................................................................ v 
List of Figures .............................................................................................................. vi 
Chapter 1:  Introduction ................................................................................................ 1 
Chapter 2: Employment Centers and Economic Development – Evidence from the 
State of Maryland .......................................................................................................... 8 
2.1 Introduction ......................................................................................................... 8 
2.2 Study Area, Data and Research Design ............................................................ 11 
2.3 Employment Centers in the State of Maryland ................................................. 13 
2.4  Empirical Models and Variables ...................................................................... 19 
2.5 Empirical Results .............................................................................................. 23 
2.5.1 Agglomeration Economies......................................................................... 24 
2.5.2 Agglomeration Effects and Centers ........................................................... 29 
2.5.3 Scale Effects ............................................................................................... 33 
2.5.4 Diversity Effects ........................................................................................ 34 
2.6  Conclusions and Policy Implications ............................................................... 39 
Chapter 3: Job Loss and Housing Foreclosures – Evidence from the State of 
Maryland ..................................................................................................................... 41 
3.1 Introduction ....................................................................................................... 41 
3.2 Literature ........................................................................................................... 43 
3.3 The Model ......................................................................................................... 47 
3.4 Data and Variables ............................................................................................ 49 
3.4.1 Data ............................................................................................................ 49 
3.4.2 Variables .................................................................................................... 51 
3.5 Foreclosures and Job Losses in Maryland ........................................................ 56 
3.6 Results ............................................................................................................... 64 
3.6.1 OLS Estimates ........................................................................................... 65 
3.6.2 IV Results................................................................................................... 67 
3.6.3 Robustness Check ...................................................................................... 70 




Chapter 4:  Do Off-Budget Revenues Have the Same Expenditure Behaviors as On-
Budget Revenues? Evidence from Chinese Cities ...................................................... 76 
4.1 Introduction ....................................................................................................... 76 
4.2 Fiscal Pressure, Land Revenues and Urban Development in China ................. 80 
4.2.1 Fiscal Pressure ........................................................................................... 80 
4.2.2 Land Institution and Land Market Development ....................................... 82 
4.2.3 Off-budget Revenues, Land Revenues, and Urban Infrastructure Financing
............................................................................................................................. 85 
4.3 The Model ......................................................................................................... 88 
4.4 Data and Variables ............................................................................................ 91 
4.5 Empirical Results .............................................................................................. 95 
4.5.1 Budgetary Expenditure Behaviors ............................................................. 95 
4.5.2 Do Off-budget Revenues Crowd out Budgetary Expenditure? ................. 97 
4.5.3 Size and Performance of Public Sector Activities and Land Revenues ..... 99 
4.6 Final Remarks and Conclusions...................................................................... 106 
















List of Tables 
 
Table 1: Characteristics of Employment Centers in Maryland ................................... 15 
Table 2: Summary Statistics of Variables ................................................................... 26 
Table 3: Urbanization Effects and Employment Centers ........................................... 27 
Table 4: Localization Effects and Employment Centers ............................................ 28 
Table 5: Marginal Effects of Urbanization and Localization inside/outside 
Employment Centers ................................................................................................... 31 
Table 6: Scale Effects of Employment Centers .......................................................... 37 
Table 7: Diversity Effects of Employment Centers .................................................... 38 
Table 8: Summary Statistics of Variables ................................................................... 56 
Table 9: The Commuting Pattern in Maryland by Census Tracts .............................. 62 
Table 10: The Commute Pattern of Maryland’s Workers across States ..................... 63 
Table 11: OLS Estimates of Effects of Job Loss on Foreclosures .............................. 66 
Table 12: First Stage Estimates: Net Employment Loss as an Instrument for Job 
Destruction .................................................................................................................. 69 
Table 13: 2SLS Estimates of Effects of Job Loss on Foreclosures ............................ 70 
Table 14: Robustness with Different Foreclosure Delays .......................................... 72 
Table 15: Robustness with Linear Models, IV 2SLS ................................................. 72 
Table 16: Robustness with Poisson Model, IV GMM ................................................ 73 
Table 17: Summary Statistics of Fiscal Data, 1999-2006........................................... 94 
Table 18: Marginal Preferences of Expenditure of Budgetary Revenues ................... 96 
Table 19: OLS Estimates of Equation (4) ................................................................... 98 
Table 20: The Size or Performance of Public Activities that Should Not Be Correlated 
with Land Revenues .................................................................................................. 102 
Table 21: The Size or Performance of Public Activities That are Correlated with Land 
Revenues ................................................................................................................... 104 
Table 22: The Size or Performance of Public Activities That are not Correlated with 





List of Figures 
Figure 1: Nineteen Centers in Maryland and a Detail Map for Baltimore - Washington 
Region ......................................................................................................................... 18 
Figure 2: Housing Foreclosures in Maryland, 2006-2009 .......................................... 57 
Figure 3: Foreclosure Rate in Maryland, 2008 ........................................................... 58 
Figure 4: Changes of Employment and Unemployment Rate in Maryland ................ 59 
Figure 5: Employment Change, 2006 Quarter 1 - 2007 Quarter 2 ............................. 60 
Figure 6: Employment Change, 2008 Quarter 2 - 2009 Quarter 2 ............................. 61 
Figure 7: Fiscal Balance (100 Million RMB) ............................................................. 81 
Figure 8: Ratio of Intergovernmental Transfer over Local Own Revenue ................. 82 





Chapter 1:  Introduction 
Cities are one of the most significant landscapes created in human civilization.  
Despite a long history of thousands of years, cities did not start the unprecedented 
growth until about one hundred years ago.  In 1800, only 3% of worldwide population 
lived in cities.  The urbanization rate increased to 14% in 1900, 50% in 2010, and is 
projected to reach 69% in 2050.1  The importance of cities is associated with their 
high productivities and spatial concentration.  In 2000, the top 38 cities in the 
European Union occupied 0.6% of land, but accommodated about 25% of its 
population and 30% of its GDP (Henderson and Thisse, 2004).  In Japan in 1998, the 
three main metropolitan areas (Tokyo and Kanagawa prefectures, Aichi prefecture, 
and Osaka and Hyogo prefectures) covered 5.2% of land, 33% of its population and 
42% of its GDP.  In cities such as Shanghai, Mumbai, New York and Paris, the local 
population account for 1.15%, 1.78% 6.18% and 17.85% of the national total, and 
produce 1.41%, 3.12%, 8.5% and 27.9% of the national GDP, respectively.2  
While holding the similar importance and significance, cities distinguish 
themselves from each other in many different ways.  Some large cities in the United 
States such as Phoenix, San Diego, Houston and Dallas grew their population by 
11.3, 2.7, 2.3 and 1.7 times from 1950 – 2000, while Pittsburgh, Buffalo, Detroit and 
Cleveland lost population by 50.5%, 49.5%, 48.6% and 47.8%, respectively; the cities 
of Atlanta and Barcelona have similar population sizes (2.5 and 2.8 million in 1990, 
                                                 
1 The data come from United Nations (2011) and http://www.edge.org/q2007/q07_12.html#brand. 




respectively), but the land area of the former is 26.4 times as large as the latter; 88% 
of American workers used a vehicle to get to work in 2005, when most workers in 
Chinese cities commute by bicycle and public transportation; Silicon Valley and 
Route 128 mainly consist of high technology firms, while New York, Chicago and 
Los Angeles are clustered with a variety of industries.   
However, the driving forces behind urban development are similar.  For 
economic cities,  literature support the following reasons to explain the existence of 
cities: 1) scale economies in production – that enterprises become more efficient at 
large scales of operation, which favor the formation of large enterprises and 
employment concentration; 2) agglomeration economies – that a firm benefits from 
being adjacent to other business enterprises, which encourage the cluster of firms; 3) 
transportation costs, which influence where a firm locates and enhance the spatial 
concentration of jobs; 4) retail agglomeration, that the geographic concentration of 
retail outlets reduces the costs of shopping trips and comparison shopping 
(O’Sullivan, 1999; Brueckner, 2007).  Factors that discourage urban development are 
associated with negative consequences resulting from city size.  These factors include 
high costs on living and commuting, pollution costs, crime, and the concentration of 
low-income people.   
Besides the economic forces, government plays an important role in urban 
growth and dynamics.  City governments need to correct market failures in urban 
growth and spatial development.  While government policies generally include 




Musgrave, 1980), city governments (local governments) are primarily responsible for 
the provision of public goods and services (resource allocation), including education, 
highways, police and fire protection, parks and sewers.  Negative externalities among 
different types of land uses are common and need to be addressed to increase social 
welfare for city residents. 
In examining the micro-foundation of city growth and development, three 
main agents that play important roles have been identified as residents (workers), 
firms and governments.  The city landscape is influenced by each of them as well as 
by interactions among them.  Accordingly, city has two most dynamic markets that 
determine the wellbeing and health of city economy.  The two dynamic markets are 
labor market and housing market.  Residential land covers about 80% of urban land, 
and accounts for the largest share of households’ assets.  Through the housing market 
people find shelters to live, make their residential location decisions, and make 
portfolio investments.  The interactions between labor market and housing market 
influence urban dynamics as well. 
Given these understandings and theories, this dissertation tries to do empirical 
researches in urban development.  The empirical researches are based on existing 
theories or theoretical hypothesis on the behaviors of firms, residents and 
governments.  The empirical results provide evidence that test the validity of these 
theories or hypothesis.  The tests, as well as the estimation of the hypothetical effects, 




This dissertation tries to improve the understanding of urban development 
from three respects: agglomeration economies and employment centers, interactions 
between labor market and housing market, and the behaviors of local governments.  
While each topic is broad, I narrow down my research questions to be more specific.  
The first essay asks whether employment centers have effects on economic 
development.  The second essay asks whether job loss affects housing foreclosures.  
The third essay asks whether local governments spend off-budget revenues differently 
from the way they spend on-budget revenues. 
Answering these three questions is important to both urban scholars and 
policy makers.  Regarding urban development and growth, what I discuss extensively 
in theory are agglomeration economies, and what I observe prominently in reality are 
employment centers (including CBD and sub-centers).  Therefore, the first essay 
exploring the role of employment centers not only provides evidence on 
agglomeration effects, but also generates important policy implications on urban 
development.  The second essay contributes to the impact from labor market bust to 
local housing markets, which is understudied largely because of the spatial 
segregation between workplace and residence.  This essay is also associated with the 
foreclosure literature in terms of the effects of trigger events, which obtain mixed 
evidence.  The third essay sheds light on one consequence of economic and fiscal 
decentralization, the rise of off-budget revenues.  This is important because literature 
assume different spending patterns of on-budget and off-budget revenues, but 
empirical evidence is scarce due to data unavailability.  This study improves our 




I apply the following methodologies to answer the above research questions.  
In the first essay I identify employment centers in Maryland by the conventional 
thresholds on employment density and total employment size.  Then I employ the 
birth model developed by Carlton (1983) and Rosenthal and Strange (2003, 2005) in 
estimating the effects of agglomeration and employment centers on the location 
decisions of new establishments.  I distinguish the effects of employment centers by 
their industrial diversities and employment sizes.  The second essay links workplace 
to residence via the commute information.  I develop the job loss vulnerability index 
for each residential neighborhood as the indicator for unemployment risk, based on 
job loss measures at workplace and the commute data from workplace to residence.  
Then I regress the number of foreclosures on the job loss index as well as other 
controls.  In the third essay I first disclose the expenditure behaviors of budgetary 
revenues by an accounting type of regression analysis.  I then estimate a demand 
model to examine whether off-budget revenues crowd out budgetary expenditures.  
The off-budget revenues are proxied by land revenues, which account for 80-90 
percent of total off-budget revenues in Chinese cities.  Finally I estimate the effects of 
on-budget and off-budget revenues on the size and performance of a variety of public 
sectors. 
I employ small geographic level data (Census Tract and Transportation 
Analysis Zone or TAZ) in the State of Maryland and city-level data in China for the 
three empirical studies.  The data for Maryland mainly include establishments, 
employment, foreclosures and commute patterns, while the data for China involve on-




the effects of employment centers requires the small geographic level data, because 
centers accommodate a large number of jobs but cover a small piece of land.3  Testing 
the job loss effect on foreclosures prefers the small geographic level data as well, 
because this effect occurs at the household level, and the aggregate of broad areas 
such as state and metropolitan area would impair the efficiency, and also generate 
more potentially omitted variables.  When using census tracts within Maryland, for 
example, the sample size increases, and the state’s foreclosure policies are the same 
to every tract in one period.  In the third essay on off-budget behaviors I use the city-
level data in China, where the off-budget land revenues are mostly controlled and 
allocated by city and county governments.  So the city-level aggregation is able to 
capture most of the off-budget revenues.4 
The three dissertation essays produce interesting results.  First, strong effects 
are present from employment centers to local economic development, particularly 
from the centers with high diversities or large employment sizes.  These centers 
should be favored in local urban policies.  Second, job loss increases foreclosures to a 
large extent: a one percent increase in the job loss index raises foreclosures by 0.85 
percent.  This finding is different from traditional literature that use state or county 
level unemployment rate proxying the individual worker’s unemployment risk, and 
end up with mixed results.  This finding also provides strong evidence for the impacts 
from labor market to housing market.  Third, off-budget revenues do not crowd out 
budgetary expenditures in Chinese cities, and are disproportionately associated with 
public sector activities that are visible and tangible.  It raises concerns over the 
                                                 
3 For example, 19 employment centers in Maryland occupy 1% of land and accommodate 36% of jobs. 




budgetary control and expenditure behaviors.  In sum, underestimating the roles of 
employment centers, job loss and off-budget funds would more or less bias our 
understandings on urban economic growth, labor and housing market dynamics, and 
the behaviors of local governments, respectively. 




Chapter 2: Employment Centers and Economic Development – 
Evidence from the State of Maryland 
 
2.1 Introduction 
A great deal of attention in the recent literature has been given to the role and 
effect of agglomeration, or clusters of economic activities, on the formation of cities 
and their dynamics.  Forces that lead to concentration of industries in employment 
centers as well as of aggregate activity in cities are known as agglomeration 
economies.  Agglomeration economies provide economic benefits to firms or 
businesses located in centers or close to existing establishments based on 
microfoundations of knowledge spillovers, labor pooling, input sharing, home market 
effects, and consumption effects (Rosenthal and Strange 2004).  These micro-
foundations are theorized into different types of agglomerative economies: one is 
called localization economies (the Marshall-Arrow-Romer (MAR) externality) and 
the other is urbanization economies (the Jacobs externality).  The former usually 
refers to external effects generated from the same industry while the latter is 
associated with the diversity of industrial structure (Glaeser et al. 1992).   
The literature presents convincing evidence to positive effects of 
agglomerative economies on industrial productivity, economic growth, and wages.  
Significant and substantial positive effects of urbanization economies are found in 
studies by Combes et al (2012), Fogarty and Garofalo (1988), Moomaw (1983), 




economies are estimated by Henderson (1986 and 2003), Nakamura (1985), and 
Rosenthal and Strange (2003 and 2005), the evidence for localization economies is 
strong and robust while the significance of the urbanization economies cannot be 
determined.   
The agglomerative economies are main forces behind the formation and 
evolution of employment centers.  As employment is decentralized responding to 
falling transportation costs, jobs and businesses tend to concentrate in geographically 
confined areas, which in turn creates employment centers and transforms 
metropolitan areas into a polycentric form.  Theoretical models have shown that firms 
leave the CBD to reduce congestion costs, but concentrate in employment subcenters 
for agglomeration benefits (Anas & Kim 1996; Berliant & Konishi 2000; Fujita & 
Ogawa 1982; Fujita, Thisse & Zenou 1997; and Helsley & Sullivan 1991).  Multiple 
subcenters have emerged in large metropolitan areas in the United States like Los 
Angeles, Chicago, New York, San Francisco, Boston, Baltimore-DC, Atlanta, and 
Cleveland and focuses have been on the identification of employment subcenters 
(Bogart & Ferry 1999; Giuliano et al. 2007; and McDonald & Prather 1994).   
Although agglomerative effects are very important in the formation and 
development of employment centers, there are relatively few attempts to empirically 
examine the impacts of employment centers on economic development.   Fujita and 
Ogawa (1982) conclude that agglomeration and commuting costs are associated with 
number of employment centers.  Kohlhase and Ju (2007) find both agglomeration 




industrial groups.  Feser, Renski and Goldstein (2008) examine the connection 
between clusters and economic development in the Appalachia region and find no 
supporting evidence for positive impact of employment centers.  Despite those 
studies, I still have quite limited knowledge about the magnitude of agglomeration 
effects inside or outside employment centers.   
The objective of this paper is to answer the following two related research 
questions.  The first is whether there are effects of employment centers on economic 
growth, and if so, whether different industries exhibit different effects.  The second 
research question is whether the economic growth effects are affected by 
characteristics of employment centers.  I especially focus on the association of 
economic growth with size and industrial composition of employment centers.   
To answer these questions, the research framework is designed as follows.  
First, I develop a measure used to identify employment centers.  Second, I use size 
and diversity index to classify them into two types of categories.  One is by size 
(large, medium, and small) and the other is by diversity level (low-level diverse, 
medium-level diverse and high-level diverse).  Third, I use GIS to calculate 
employment of all sectors or own sector within one mile to gauge urbanization or 
localization economies, respectively.5   Fourth and finally, I use an establishment-
birth model, first developed by Carlton (1983) and used by Rosenthal and Strange 
(2003; 2005), to examine the effects of urbanization and localization economies on 
new firms as well as how the effects are affected by the presence and characteristics 
                                                 





of employment centers/subcenters.  Through the Tobit estimator that yields unbiased 
and consistent results while conventional OLS model is biased, I examine both direct 
and indirect effects of employment centers, which have not been found in the 
literature.  The direct effect is captured by a dummy variable for employment centers 
and the indirect effect is captured by interactive terms between the center dummy 
variable and variables of localization and urbanization.  The hypothesis is that the 
presence of employment centers may bias the estimated effects of both localization 
and urbanization externalities if they are absent from regression models.  I believe 
that this paper contributes to our general understanding of agglomerative effects not 
only by incorporating centers and their characteristics but also by proposing a 
research design/framework that can be applicable elsewhere.  
This paper is organized as follows.  The second section describes the study 
area and data sets used in this paper, as well as the research design.  Section 3 
identifies employment centers and characterizes them.  Section 4 describes my 
empirical approaches, and section 5 presents estimated results.  Section 6 finishes off 
with final remarks and conclusions. 
2.2 Study Area, Data and Research Design 
The study area is the state of Maryland.  As a small state, Maryland does not 
have a strong industrial base, particularly in the manufacturing sector.  In terms of 
employment by the second quarter of 2007, Health Care and Social Assistance 




Professional, Science & Technical Services.  Public Administration, Construction, 
and Administrative & Waste services rank the fifth, sixth, and seventh, respectively.   
Data used in the paper come from the Quarterly Census of Employment and 
Wages (QCEW) data from 2007 Quarter 2 to 2008 Quarter 2.  This data set contains 
over 1.6 million establishments with information of unique id, monthly employment, 
NAICS code, physical address, wage, etc.  The unique id enables us to identify births 
of new establishments.  I use the geocoding function of GIS software to pinpoint 
geographic locations of jobs and firms.  More than 80% of total establishments are 
matched.  The geocoded data is then aggregated into TAZs (Traffic Analysis Zones) 
as my basic spatial analysis unit.  There are 4,113 TAZ tracts.6  I then use the detailed 
location information of industrial establishments and jobs to identify centers and to 
create variables.  Maryland Property View and Centerline datasets are used to 
measure property value and transportation accessibility.  Finally, all variables are 
organized and/or generated from GIS functions.   
Three criteria were used in selecting industries for this study.  First, they are 
important industries in terms of agglomeration and have been studied by other related 
literature.  Second, their presence in Maryland should be sizable.  Third, their growth 
rates in the study period should not be trivial.  Although Maryland does not have 
strong manufacturing bases, this does not preclude us to examine agglomerative 
effects.  Arzaghi and Henderson (2008) imply that agglomeration economies exist not 
                                                 
6 A few counties do not have TAZ, then I use block group instead. I prefer TAZs as the study unit 
rather than census tract or block group because TAZs are delineated based on function, while census 
tract and block group are delineated based on population (Giuliano & Small 1991).  It should be 




only in manufacturing but also in business and financial services.  Given those, three 
service sectors are included in the study.  They are: Finance and Insurance; 
Professional, Scientific and Technical Services (labeled as Professional Services 
here); and Administrative and Support and Waste Management and Remediation 
Services (labeled as Administrative & Waste Services).  Those sectors are important 
to the state in terms of employment share and new establishments.  In addition, 
Construction becomes the fourth sector to be included in this study.7  Construction 
sector is important to Maryland as it represents 7.4% of total workers in Maryland in 
2007 (Quarter 2) and accounts for 12.2% of total new establishments from the second 
quarter 2007 to the second quarter 2008.   
2.3 Employment Centers in the State of Maryland 
I use two criteria to identify employment centers.  One is the minimum 
employment density of nine workers per acre and the other is a total of at least 10,000 
employees.8  This minimum employment density is lower than one used by Giuliano 
and Small (1991) to reflect overall difference between Maryland and Los Angeles 
metropolitan areas.  I identify 19 centers. 
Studies have shown the importance of employment centers to the development 
of metropolitan areas (Cumbers & MacKinnon 2004; Bogart & Ferry 1999; and 
Giuliano & Small 1991).  The State of Maryland is not an exception.  These 19 
                                                 
7 Henderson (2003) also examines the agglomerative effect of the Construction economy. 
8 Giuliano and Small (1991) use 10 workers per acre and 10,000 or 7,000 workers up to regions as 
cutoffs to delineate employment centers while Bogart and Ferry (1999) use 8 employees per acre and 
minimum of 10,000 jobs.  Small and Song (1994) define employment centers to have at least 




centers occupy around one percent of land but house a quarter of all establishments, 
provide 36.2% of total jobs, and contribute 44.3% of wage incomes.  They are also 
growth engines by capturing 21% of new start-ups and nearly one-third new-
establishment jobs in the State during the study period.   
Employment density of employment centers is much higher than that in the 
rest of the State.  The average employment density of all centers is 18.3 workers per 
acre, or 11,712 workers per square mile while the overall employment density is 327 
workers per square miles for the State.   The wage difference between centers and 
non-centers may be used to indicate the effect of high employment density or 
agglomerative economy.  On an average, workers in the centers earn 35% higher 




Table 1: Characteristics of Employment Centers in Maryland 







Bethesda - Germantown 
(along I-270 and M-355)
Montgomery 16019.7 364078 22.7 61394 11.096
Downtown Baltimore Baltimore City 6915.3 234522 33.9 56614 9.543
Greenbelt - College Park 
(along Route 1)
Prince George 7870.9 92222 11.7 46511 9.732
Columbia Howard 6133.5 73069 11.9 54973 9.311
Towson Baltimore 2830.8 71639 25.3 47707 9.572
Hunt Valley Baltimore 3316.7 55794 16.8 51931 9.955
Annapolis Anne Arundel 2720.9 50185 18.4 43216 8.300
Silver Spring Montgomery 1685.2 44141 26.2 53775 8.217
Reisterstown Rd Baltimore 3593.6 40767 11.3 40017 10.609
Frederick Frederick 2718.2 40333 14.8 42481 10.796
Landover Prince George 2346.6 34641 14.8 63356 9.318
Woodlawn Baltimore 1783.6 33989 19.1 55440 5.300
Salisbury                           
(along Route 13)
Wicomico 2696.7 28380 10.5 35724 10.849
Linthicum Heights Anne Arundel 1581.4 19482 12.3 84510 4.712
Largo Prince George 1611.6 17833 11.1 44129 9.950
St. Charles - Waldorf Charles 1256.3 15472 12.3 28694 7.406
Bel Air Harford 1474.5 13960 9.5 32998 9.061
Hagerstown Washington 857.4 13417 15.6 34525 6.802
Westminster Carroll 1072.3 10585 9.9 33866 7.464
68485.1 1254506 18.3 53828 8.842




Nineteen centers demonstrate substantial variations in terms of size and 
industrial composition.  Bethesda---Germantown and Downtown Baltimore are the 
two largest centers, accommodating 364,078 and 234,522 employees, respectively.  
Only those two centers exceed 100,000 employments.  Both have high employment 
density, ranked as the 4th and the 1st among the 19 centers, as well as high annual 
wage, ranked as the 3rd and the 4th.  Nine centers with less than 40,000 workers are 
grouped as small centers.  They include Westminster, Hagerstown, Bel Air, St. 




They are generally associated with lower job density and annual wage than other 
centers.  The remaining eight centers are classified as medium sized group. 
The inverse of Herfindahl index is used to characterize the 19 centers in terms 
of industrial diversity. The index is calculated as:  







where sk is the employment share of the k
th 2-digit industry in each center.  There are 
totally 20 2-digit industries based on NAICS industry classification.9  This index 
value equals one if the center is fully concentrated in a sector, and increases as a 
center becomes more diverse. 
I use the index values to group the 19 centers into three types.  Type I includes 
five specialized centers, dominated by quite a few sectors.  Two of them are One-
Sector Dominant Specialized centers.  One is Linthicum Heights in Anne Arundel, in 
which Manufacturing sector accounts for 41.72% of total jobs in the center (two other 
largest sectors are Transportation and Warehouse, each contributes 11% of total jobs 
in the center).  Linthicum Heights is the only manufacturing base in the State.10  The 
other One-Sector Dominant Specialized center is Woodlawn in Baltimore in which 
Public Administration is the most dominant sector with nearly 40%of jobs and no 
other sector makes up more than 10% of jobs.  The remaining three centers in Type I 
                                                 
9 The 20 sectors are: Accommodation and Food; Administrative and Waste Services; Arts, 
Entertainment and Recreation; Construction; Education; Finance and Insurance; Health Care and 
Social Assistance; Information; Management; Manufacturing; Professional, Scientific and Technical 
Services; Real Estate; Retail Trade; Transportation and Warehouse; Utilities; Wholesale; and others. 




are specialized in two or three sectors.  They are Hagerstown, St. Charles – Waldorf 
and Westminster.  Hagerstown is specialized in Health Care and Social Assistance 
(29.08%), Public Administration (19.62%), and Information (8.27%); St. Charles – 
Waldorf is dominated by Retail Trade (28.05%), Accommodation and Food 
(16.67%), and Health Care and Social Assistance (8.53%); Westminster is 
concentrated with Health Care and Social Assistance (28.7%), Public Administration 
(13.7%), and Retail Trade (8.4%).  These three centers have a common feature that 
the three largest sectors make up more than half of the total employment.  All five 
centers in Type I have the diversity index value less than 8. 
On contrast, Type III is diversified centers in which none of industrial sectors 
dominates.  This group includes nine centers with the diversity index value larger 
than 9.5.  Nine centers are: Bethesda – Germantown, Salisbury, Frederick, 
Reisterstown Rd, Hunt Valley, Largo, Greenbelt – College Park, Towson, and 
Downtown Baltimore.  These nine centers have common features of (1) there are 
more than seven sectors with more than 5% of jobs (except Downtown Baltimore); 
(2) no single sector has more than 20% of jobs.  The remaining five out of 19 centers 
belong to Type II characterized by diversified sectors with a moderately dominated 
sector (at least 20% of employment in four of the centers).   
By industrial sectors, the State Capital Annapolis and some county seats such 
as Hagerstown and Westminster are home to a plenty of government jobs.  
Construction has substantial presence in Largo and Greenbelt - College Park while 




Spring, Towson, Landover and Frederick.  Finance and Insurance firms tend to locate 
in Hunt Valley and Reisterstown Rd.  Public Administration is well present across 
centers by at least 10% share of jobs.  
The State’s centers are primarily located in its geographic center, particularly 
around Baltimore City and areas between Baltimore and DC cities (Figure 1).  Two 
corridors (I-270 and Route #1) are the two most dominant areas of industrial 
concentration.  Figures 1 also illustrates that employment centers may have irregular 
geographic shapes that make it hard to fully capture agglomerative economies using 
fixed distance buffer zones (one or five miles), subject to potential estimation biases 
from regression analyses (Fotheringham & Rogerson 1993; Fotheringham & Wong 
1991).     
 





2.4  Empirical Models and Variables 
I use the birth model, which is first developed by Carlton (1983) and then 
used by Rosenthal and Strange (2003), to estimate agglomerative effects.  The 
underlined theory is that new establishments have a tendency to locate near existing 
firms or jobs to enjoy agglomerative economies, or jobs or existing firms create a 
business environment in a way that is appealing and attractive to new firms.  In a 
simple framework, I assume a firm makes an independent location decision to 
maximize its profit.  Normalizing the price of output to one, the profit of an 
establishment equals , where g(Z) shifts the production 
function F(X), Z contains local characteristics, and X contains inputs that cost C(X).  
Given all other things equal and the presence of agglomerative economies 
(localization, urbanization or both), an establishment aims to locate close to other 
establishments/jobs in the same sector or in all sectors to fully capture agglomerative 
effects.  Therefore, locations of existing establishments affect location choices of new 
firms.   
In the base model, I use the number of new establishments per acre in TAZs 
as the dependent variable.  Independent variables include urbanization economy, 
localization economy, as well as the control variables.  The model is expressed as:11 
(1) iijiij CLUN 3210    
                                                 




where i denotes tract, j denotes sector, Ni is the number of births per acre, Ui is 
urbanization economy, Lij is localization economy, and Ci contains all other control 
variables.   
New establishments during 2007 Quarter 2 and 2008 Quarter 2 are identified.  
But I exclude those opened by existing Multi-unit firms because their location 
decisions are likely affected by existing establishments in the same firm.  Within 1 
mile radius of TAZ centroids, total employment of all jobs and total employment in 
the own industry are used as proxies to urbanization economy (Ui) and localization 
economies (Li), respectively.  Since agglomerative effects decline very rapidly with 
distance, I believe that the 1 mile geographic scope is likely to capture most, if not all, 
of such externalities (Kohlhase & Ju 2007; and Rosenthal & Strange 2010).  If 
urbanization and localization economies are both present, I should observe positive 
and significant α1 and α2.   
My control variables, represented by Ci, include factors that may influence 
locations of new establishments.  The competition factor is captured by firms per 
worker inside and outside the own industry.  Congestion factor is controlled via 
average property value and average speed in peak hours in each TAZ.  Because 
agglomeration raises congestion level, a failure to capture congestion effects may 
upwardly bias agglomerative effects.  I control transportation accessibility by four 
variables: distance to the nearest interstate highway ramp, distance to the nearest 
Maryland/US highway, and two dummy variables representing whether there is a bus 




types of transportation infrastructure influence a firm’s location decisions in the past 
and at present, missing them will bias coefficients for agglomeration variables.  
Finally, I also control for county fixed effects.  They will hopefully capture county-
level policies, zonings, natural endowment, local tax structure, etc.   
The second model extends the model (1) by including dummy variables (EC) 
for centers and interactive terms of localization and urbanization economies with the 
dummy variables to capture the effects from employment centers.  The model is 
expressed as:  
(2) iijiiiijiiij CLECUECLUECN 6543210 **    
It is expected that (1) signs of β1, β 4, and β 5 are significantly positive and (2) these 
significant positive signs imply that employment centers enhance agglomeration 
economies, and missing the center dummy may cause overestimation of 
agglomeration effects.  
The third model estimates the scale effects of employment centers.  If there is 
a scale effect, the chance to establish a new firm is higher inside large-size centers 
than inside small-size centers.  In order to examine scale effect, I group 19 centers 
into three sizes: small, medium, and large centers, and create corresponding dummy 
variables. Three sizes of centers are: small centers with less than 40,000 
employments, medium centers with employment between 40,000 and 100,000, and 




groups by centers’ employment sizes and they are: DEClow, DECmed and DEChigh The 









3210    
The undermined understanding behind this model specification is that the effect of 
centers is correlated with center size as demonstrated by increasing returns and 
continuously rising of the world largest cities like New York and Tokyo.  Therefore,  
If a scale effect is present, I expect that I have γ3> γ2> γ1, and all of these coefficients 
are positively significant.  Similar to equation (2), I also include interaction terms 
between these three sizes of centers and urbanization/localization economies, in order 
to estimate agglomerative effects in centers with different scales. 
In the fourth model I try to estimate the impact of industrial composition on 
the agglomerative economies.  I hypothesize that new firms are more likely to be 
created in locations close to diverse centers than to specialized centers.  I create 
dummy variables for the three groups by the diversity index values and they are: 
DIEClow, DIECmed and DIEChigh, representing centers with low-, medium-, and high- 







iij CLUDIECDIECDIECN 6543210    
The undermined understanding behind the model specification is that new firms are 
more likely located in locations with more diverse industrial mixes (Duranton and 
Puga 2000).  So I expect that the magnitude of coefficients follows the order of δ3> 




created is higher in diverse centers than in specialized ones.  Similar to function (2), I 
also generate interaction terms between these three groups of centers and 
urbanization/localization economies, in order to estimate the impact of industrial 
composition on agglomerative effects. 
Table 2 lists descriptive statistics of variables.  It shows that Professional 
Services has the highest birth density, 0.0025 per acre, and the strongest localization 
effects, 593.8 own industry workers on average within 1 mile of the TAZ’s centroid.  
On the contrary, Construction has the least localization effects, as well as the 2nd 
lowest birth density.  These simple facts may imply strong localization effects in the 
creation of new establishments.  Professional Service tends to have small-size firms 
with the firms/worker ratio of 0.36, while Finance and Insurance tends to have large-
size firms with the firms/worker ratio of 0.15.   The indicators of firms per worker 
inside and outside the own industry suggest that, Construction, Professional Services 
and Administrative & Waste Services all have stronger competition, while Finance & 
Insurance has less competition than other industries.  Bus stations serve more than a 
half of all TAZs and average distance to the nearest highway is about 3.3 miles. 
Average peak hour speed is 24 miles. 
2.5 Empirical Results 
Those four models are all estimated with the Tobit estimator because a large 
part of TAZs do not have any new establishments during the study period.  The 




conventional OLS estimator bias (Wooldridge 2002), while the Tobit model will 
produce unbiased and consistent results.    
2.5.1 Agglomeration Economies 
Columns (1) in Table 3 and Table 4 present the estimated results of equation 
(1), where variables for employment centers and interaction terms are not included. I 
find strong evidence for both urbanization economies and localization economies, 
present in all four industrial sectors.  The magnitudes of the elasticities reveal that 
Finance & Insurance has the largest urbanization effects and Professional Services 
sector has the largest localization effects.  Construction has both the least 
urbanization and localization effects among four sectors.12  Based on estimated 
coefficients I calculate corresponding elasticities.  I find that, doubling total 
employment within one mile increases the birth density of new establishments by 
30.5% in Finance & Insurance, 26.9% in Professional Services, 15.6% in 
Administrative & Waste Services, and 5.7% in Construction; doubling employment in 
own industry within one mile increases birth density of new firms by 20.2% in 
Professional Services, 14.3% in Finance & Insurance, 12.9% in Administrative & 
Waste Services, and 9.7% in Construction.  These results suggest a positive effect of 
agglomeration and its variation across sectors.   
Most of the control variables have coefficients with expected signs. Local 
competition in own industry encourages births of new establishments, while in other 
                                                 
12 In Tobit model ...,2211  xxXBY   the marginal effect of x1 does not equal to β1, but 
)/(*1  XB , as discussed in Appendix.  So I need to consider marginal effects or elasticities 




industries discourages births.  This may imply the tradeoff between competition and 
monopoly in externality-generating activities like research and development (Glaeser 
et al. 1992).  Cheap locations may be favorable to firms particularly in Administrative 
& Waste Services, but are less likely to affect firms in other sectors.  Professional 
Services sector is sensitive to congestion level, which has little impact on location 
choice for other three industries.  Adjacency to transportation facilities such as 
highways, bus stations and metro stations could also save transportation costs for 
firms, and thus encourages local births.  High housing prices tend to discourage new 
firms, as shown by negative coefficients for all cases although only Administration 
and Waster Services has significant coefficients at least 95% level and both 
Construction and Finance and Insurance have significant coefficients at margin.  
Transportation variables have mixed results. Highways tend to affect firms in 
Construction and Finance and Insurance while the presence of Metro Stations tends to 
affect location decisions for Professional Services and Administrative and Waste 




Table 2: Summary Statistics of Variables 
Industries Variables Obs. Mean Std Dev. Min Max
Number of new 
establishments per acre
4113 0.00095 0.00382 0 0.11383
Localization 4113 283.78 566.44 0 4857
Firms/workers own industry 4113 0.24920 0.40351 0 6
Firms/workers other 
industries
4113 0.19882 0.33000 0 9
Number of new 
establishments per acre
4113 0.00064 0.00549 0 0.16707
Localization 4113 314.92 1193.06 0 12079
Firms/workers own industry 4113 0.14561 0.32650 0 4
Firms/workers other 
industries
4113 0.19013 0.27314 0 6
Number of new 
establishments per acre
4113 0.00252 0.01302 0 0.34150
Localization 4113 593.80 1677.23 0 13679
Firms/workers own industry 4113 0.36050 0.62123 0 12
Firms/workers other 
industries
4113 0.18754 0.28185 0 6
Number of new 
establishments per acre
4113 0.00083 0.00493 0 0.14775
Localization 4113 358.01 955.06 0 8597
Firms/workers own industry 4113 0.20802 0.43908 0 9
Firms/workers other 
industries
4113 0.19658 0.31186 0 9
Dummy: employment center 4113 0.11695 0.32140 0 1
Urbanization 4113 5290.13 11434.23 0 112100
Property price 4006 203.0 155.1 13.3 7220.3
Average speed in peak hours 4084 24.1 3.5 13.5 39.3
Distance to the nearest 
interstate highway ramp (feet)
4113 17429.3 24443.4 0.2 204887.8
Distance to the nearest 
Maryland/US highway (feet)
4113 2867.0 2760.6 4.6 37015.0
Dummy: metro station within 
1 mile
4113 0.13 0.34 0 1
Dummy: bus station within 1 
mile
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Table 3: Urbanization Effects and Employment Centers 
Model (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
1.47E-03 2.68E-04 9.23E-03 9.47E-03 8.75E-03 3.88E-03 3.29E-03 1.41E-03
(1.87) (0.28) (4.09) (3.48) (4.49) (1.65) (2.61) (0.94)
5.62E-08 3.36E-08 -9.14E-08 5.48E-07 4.13E-07 4.37E-07 7.27E-07 6.02E-07 1.48E-07 2.11E-07 1.64E-07 -4.37E-08
(2.67) (1.38) (-1.48) (9.00) (6.10) (2.67) (14.14) (10.36) (1.06) (6.66) (4.48) (-0.43)
1.45E-07 -2.73E-08 5.34E-07 2.34E-07
(2.24) (-0.16) (3.58) (2.19)
1.49E-03 1.52E-03 1.51E-03 2.44E-03 2.49E-03 2.49E-03 2.64E-03 2.86E-03 2.76E-03 -1.62E-04 -3.97E-05 -1.11E-04
(3.13) (3.21) (3.17) (1.22) (1.25) (1.25) (3.29) (3.57) (3.46) (-0.20) (-0.05) (-0.14)
-1.70E-03 -1.58E-03 -1.59E-03 -1.42E-02 -1.20E-02 -1.20E-02 -5.54E-03 -4.38E-03 -4.25E-03 -4.94E-03 -4.56E-03 -4.57E-03
(-2.15) (-2.00) (-2.02) (-3.53) (-3.03) (-3.04) (-2.64) (-2.09) (-2.05) (-3.02) (-2.79) (-2.80)
-5.24E-06 -4.60E-06 -4.74E-06 -1.75E-05 -1.16E-05 -1.17E-05 -3.47E-06 -1.68E-06 -1.51E-06 -1.83E-05 -1.62E-05 -1.64E-05
(-1.84) (-1.62) (-1.66) (-1.69) (-1.16) (-1.16) (-0.69) (-0.37) (-0.34) (-3.24) (-2.89) (-2.92)
5.24E-05 6.31E-05 4.51E-05 2.24E-04 3.32E-04 3.36E-04 6.41E-04 7.07E-04 6.55E-04 -5.05E-05 -1.96E-05 -4.53E-05
(0.58) (0.69) (0.49) (0.76) (1.12) (1.13) (2.74) (3.03) (2.82) (-0.33) (-0.13) (-0.29)
-3.55E-08 -3.46E-08 -3.74E-08 -1.51E-07 -1.37E-07 -1.36E-07 -7.44E-08 -6.67E-08 -7.71E-08 -3.30E-08 -3.00E-08 -3.52E-08
(-2.37) (-2.31) (-2.49) (-2.25) (-2.05) (-2.03) (-1.71) (-1.54) (-1.79) (-1.24) (-1.12) (-1.32)
-2.11E-08 -1.83E-08 -3.80E-08 -3.17E-07 -2.70E-07 -2.65E-07 9.68E-08 1.27E-07 5.27E-08 4.85E-08 5.93E-08 2.25E-08
(-0.26) (-0.23) (-0.47) (-0.94) (-0.81) (-0.80) (0.43) (0.57) (0.24) (0.33) (0.40) (0.15)
1.03E-03 7.58E-04 1.14E-03 1.84E-03 -1.59E-04 -2.32E-04 6.59E-03 4.97E-03 6.62E-03 2.51E-03 1.90E-03 2.45E-03
(1.50) (1.09) (1.59) (0.87) (-0.07) (-0.10) (3.81) (2.81) (3.64) (2.22) (1.64) (2.07)
1.25E-03 1.22E-03 1.57E-03 2.98E-03 2.60E-03 2.52E-03 2.93E-03 2.66E-03 4.06E-03 7.66E-04 6.74E-04 1.29E-03
(2.04) (2.00) (2.51) (1.34) (1.17) (1.11) (1.80) (1.63) (2.44) (0.72) (0.64) (1.18)
Log Likelihood 2181.58 2183.32 2185.96 158.17 166.56 166.57 1448.85 1458.89 1465.49 978.79 982.17 984.73
Uncensored 1017 1017 1017 333 333 333 1112 1112 1112 683 683 683
Total Obs. 3999 3999 3999 3999 3999 3999 3999 3999 3999 3999 3999 3999
County Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Distance to the nearest 
Interstate Highway Ramp
Distance to the nearest 
MD Highway
Dummy: Bus Station 
within 1 Mile
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Table 4: Localization Effects and Employment Centers 
Model (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
1.09E-03 -6.47E-04 1.11E-02 1.11E-02 8.08E-03 4.30E-03 3.23E-03 2.14E-03
(1.52) (-0.72) (5.19) (4.86) (4.22) (1.98) (2.65) (1.55)
1.80E-06 1.61E-06 3.88E-07 4.32E-06 3.28E-06 3.38E-06 4.84E-06 4.16E-06 1.90E-06 2.57E-06 2.10E-06 5.30E-07
(4.82) (4.07) (0.69) (8.61) (6.21) (2.12) (15.43) (11.88) (2.66) (7.22) (5.26) (0.51)
2.47E-06 -1.22E-07 2.94E-06 1.82E-06
(3.19) (-0.07) (3.66) (1.65)
1.63E-03 1.65E-03 1.63E-03 2.27E-03 2.40E-03 2.40E-03 2.63E-03 2.84E-03 2.77E-03 -3.78E-05 7.35E-05 -1.43E-06
(3.43) (3.49) (3.45) (1.13) (1.21) (1.21) (3.29) (3.56) (3.50) (-0.05) (0.09) (0.00)
-1.68E-03 -1.57E-03 -1.53E-03 -1.55E-02 -1.24E-02 -1.24E-02 -5.47E-03 -4.38E-03 -3.97E-03 -5.00E-03 -4.58E-03 -4.51E-03
(-2.13) (-1.99) (-1.96) (-3.79) (-3.12) (-3.11) (-2.62) (-2.11) (-1.93) (-3.05) (-2.81) (-2.77)
-4.80E-06 -4.44E-06 -4.82E-06 -2.20E-05 -1.38E-05 -1.38E-05 -4.60E-06 -2.61E-06 -2.23E-06 -1.93E-05 -1.71E-05 -1.71E-05
(-1.71) (-1.59) (-1.73) (-2.02) (-1.34) (-1.34) (-0.84) (-0.54) (-0.48) (-3.39) (-3.03) (-3.02)
4.14E-05 5.56E-05 3.68E-05 -3.62E-06 1.91E-04 1.92E-04 5.48E-04 6.29E-04 5.88E-04 -9.44E-05 -5.15E-05 -6.14E-05
(0.46) (0.61) (0.41) (-0.01) (0.64) (0.65) (2.35) (2.70) (2.55) (-0.62) (-0.34) (-0.40)
-3.50E-08 -3.39E-08 -3.62E-08 -1.71E-07 -1.45E-07 -1.45E-07 -7.62E-08 -6.81E-08 -7.34E-08 -3.56E-08 -3.16E-08 -3.39E-08
(-2.34) (-2.27) (-2.44) (-2.52) (-2.17) (-2.17) (-1.76) (-1.58) (-1.72) (-1.34) (-1.19) (-1.28)
-1.07E-08 -5.87E-09 -2.13E-08 -4.23E-07 -3.20E-07 -3.19E-07 4.01E-10 4.64E-08 2.27E-08 3.76E-08 5.37E-08 3.61E-08
(-0.13) (-0.07) (-0.26) (-1.24) (-0.96) (-0.96) (0.00) (0.21) (0.10) (0.26) (0.37) (0.25)
4.72E-04 2.58E-04 2.16E-04 4.49E-03 1.28E-03 1.25E-03 6.71E-03 5.08E-03 6.07E-03 2.52E-03 1.87E-03 2.26E-03
(0.67) (0.36) (0.30) (2.17) (0.59) (0.57) (3.91) (2.88) (3.44) (2.23) (1.62) (1.92)
1.08E-03 1.04E-03 1.25E-03 3.92E-03 3.14E-03 3.12E-03 3.10E-03 2.78E-03 3.59E-03 8.72E-04 7.39E-04 1.04E-03
(1.76) (1.71) (2.05) (1.76) (1.42) (1.40) (1.91) (1.72) (2.22) (0.83) (0.70) (0.97)
Log Likelihood 2189.25 2190.39 2195.54 153.59 167.12 167.12 1448.85 1475.26 1482.05 978.79 985.78 987.20
Uncensored 1017 1017 1017 333 333 333 1112 1112 1112 683 683 683
Total Obs. 3999 3999 3999 3999 3999 3999 3999 3999 3999 3999 3999 3999
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2.5.2 Agglomeration Effects and Centers 
Columns (2) in Table 3 and 4 show results of equation (2) without the 
interactive terms and suggest three findings. First, employment centers encourage 
births of new establishments, as expected. The coefficient of the center dummy 
variable is positive and significant when either urbanization or localization economy 
is controlled, in three sectors except Construction.  Second, the localization variable 
remains significant with the inclusion of employment center dummy variable but 
urbanization variable becomes insignificant in Construction.  These results suggest 
that localization effects are stronger and more robust than urbanization effects.  A 
similar conclusion is obtained by Henderson (2003) and Rosenthal and Strange 
(2003), respectively.  The third finding is the magnitudes of coefficients for both 
urbanization and localization variables decline after controlling the effect of centers.  
Controlling centers decreases the elasticity of localization economy from 0.202 to 
0.174 in Professional Services, from 0.143 to 0.11 in Finance & Insurance, from 
0.129 to 0.106 in Administrative & Waste Services, and from 0.097 to 0.087 in 
Construction.  Controlling centers makes the elasticity of urbanization economy 
decline from 0.305 to 0.232 in Finance & Insurance, from 0.269 to 0.224 in 
Professional Services, from 0.156 to 0.121 in Administrative & Waste Services, and 
from 0.057 to insignificant.  These results suggest that, without capturing the effect of 
centers, the measures of using fixed distance buffer zones may lead to overestimation 




Columns (3) in Table 3 and 4 report the results of equation (2) with the 
employment center dummy variable and interactive terms.  The center dummy 
variable captures the direct effect while the interactive term captures the indirect 
effect of centers on new firm development. If only interactive terms have significant 
coefficients while the center dummy variable has an insignificant coefficient, the 
results suggest that centers more likely affect births of new firms through 
urbanization and localization economies.  The results reveal that the center dummy 
variable becomes insignificant for all cases except Finance and Insurance and 
Professional Services in localization effect.   
To better understand the effects of centers, marginal effects of dummy and 
interactive variables are calculated (see Appendix for details).13  Results in Table 5 
reveal that centers strongly promote urbanization economies and localization 
economies. The results of urbanization economies are computed based on columns 
(3) in Table 3. Across four sectors, marginal effects of urbanization economies are all 
positive and significant inside centers.  Estimated coefficients imply that at the mean 
level, inside centers, doubling total employment within 1 mile increases the birth 
density by 207% in Finance and Insurance, 147% in Professional Service, 78% in 
Administrative Service, and 27% in Construction.  Outside centers, however, 
doubling total employment increases birth density by only 11.9% in Finance and 
                                                 
13 It would be easy to interpret these results in linear models, as discussed in Section 4.  But in 
nonlinear models such as Probit, Logit and Tobit, the magnitude, significance and even signs of 
interaction terms are not necessarily consistent with the real interaction effects (Ai and Norton 2003).  
I find that all eight interaction terms have positive and significant marginal effects, which measures the 
absolute change in urbanization/localization from inside to outside centers.  Notably, for Finance and 
Insurance, two interaction terms are both insignificant and exhibit negative signs.  However, after 
calculating their marginal effects, I find they are both positive and significant.  It implies that centers 
strongly promote urbanization and localization economies for this sector.  Ignoring marginal effects 




Insurance, and has insignificant effects in other three sectors.  In terms of marginal 
effect, from inside to outside centers, urbanization economies significantly declines 
by 245.2% in Construction, 117.1% in Administrative and Waste Services, 84.7% in 
Professional Services, and 51.2% in Finance and Insurance.   









NAICS 23 NAICS 52 NAICS 54 NAICS 56
-1.60E-08 2.36E-08 4.56E-08 -2.25E-09
(-1.36) (2.98) (1.69) (-0.18)
-1.84E-08 2.17E-08 2.88E-08 -5.47E-09
(-1.48) (2.67) (1.06) (-0.43)
1.27E-08 4.44E-08 1.88E-07 3.19E-08
(2.10) (5.76) (10.97) (4.97)
-3.10E-08 -2.28E-08 -1.59E-07 -3.74E-08
(-2.33) (-2.16) (-5.13) (-2.69)
-245.2% -51.2% -84.7% -117.1%
(-1.98) (-2.67) (-5.88) (-2.88)
1.45E-07 1.84E-07 4.84E-07 1.02E-07
(1.34) (2.38) (3.54) (0.81)
8.08E-08 1.64E-07 3.75E-07 6.78E-08
(0.69) (2.12) (2.66) (0.51)
5.99E-07 3.97E-07 1.32E-06 4.09E-07
(5.21) (5.87) (12.24) (5.53)
-5.18E-07 -2.33E-07 -9.41E-07 -3.41E-07
(-3.21) (-2.28) (-5.40) (-2.29)
-86.5% -58.7% -71.5% -83.4%


































Notes: t value in the parenthesis, computed based on delta method. Coefficients are in bold when 
significant at 5%. 
Localization effects are influenced similarly by employment centers.  The 
results for localization economies in Table 5 are computed based on columns (3) in 
Table 4. Estimated coefficients imply that at the mean level, inside employment 




by 137% in Professional Services, 136% in Finance and Insurance, 75% in 
Administrative and Waste Services, and 53% in Construction. Outside employment 
centers, however, doubling employment in own industry increases birth density by 
only 4% in Finance and Insurance, 3% in Professional Services, and has insignificant 
effects in other two sectors. In terms of marginal effect, from inside to outside 
centers, localization effects decline by 86.5% for Construction, 83.4% for 
Administrative and Waste Services, 71.5% for Professional Services, and 58.7% for 
Finance and Insurance. These results are consistent with polycentric city theory that 
centers provide firms with strong agglomeration economies. 
Such comparisons also support my hypothesis that ignoring employment 
centers would generate some problems in estimating agglomeration effects using a 
distance buffer (e.g., one or five miles). The first problem is the overestimation on 
agglomeration effects when overlooking effects of employment centers. The large 
size and irregular geographic shape of employment centers make it difficult to capture 
their direct and indirect effects with distance buffer. The second problem is that, 
using distance buffer fails to distinguish different magnitudes of agglomeration 
effects inside and outside employment centers. However, as the results above have 




2.5.3 Scale Effects 
Table 6 presents the results on scale effects of equation (3).14  Estimated 
results reveal that large centers have larger impacts on creation of new establishments 
than small-size centers, as expected.  For urbanization economies, the estimated 
elasticities using the coefficients from Table 6 (the columns (1)) suggest that large 
centers are not significant in Construction; increase birth density by 150.1% in 
Finance & Insurance, 52.7% in Professional Services, and 55.9% in Administrative & 
Waste Services; Medium centers only raise birth density in Finance & Insurance by 
88.9%.  For localization economies,  the estimated elasticities using the coefficients 
from Table 6 (the columns (2)) suggest that large centers are not significant in 
Construction and Professional Services sectors; increase birth density by 165.9% in 
Finance & Insurance, and 65.2% in Administrative & Waste Services.  Medium 
centers only raise birth density in Finance & Insurance by 84.7%.  For both 
urbanization and localization economies, medium sized centers may or may not 
influence Professional Services and small centers do not affect birth density in 
Construction, Finance & Insurance, or Administrative & Waste Services, and may or 
may not affect Professional Services. 
Scale effects consist of both direct and indirect effects, which means centers 
with certain sizes could encourage births of new establishments directly, or encourage 
births by boosting agglomeration economies. Coefficients of dummy variables for 
small, medium and large centers in Table 6 suggest that large centers have stronger 
                                                 
14 Other control variables are not reported due to limited space. Columns (1) control urbanization and 




direct effects than other centers.  After controlling for interaction terms, large centers 
gain positive and significant coefficients for Finance & Insurance in columns (1) and 
(2), and for Administrative & Waste Services in column (2), while most of medium 
and small centers have insignificant coefficients. 
Positive and significant coefficients for interactions between large centers and 
urbanization/localization economies imply strong indirect effects of large centers, 
rather than of small ones.  From small to large centers, the marginal effects of 
interaction terms increase in most sectors, accompanied with the rise in significance 
level.  They also indicate that large centers significantly promote urbanization and 
localization effects across all four industries.  However, medium centers promote 
urbanization only in Professional Services, and small centers have insignificant 
effects across all four sectors. Therefore, the effects I find in section 5.2 that 
employment centers foster agglomeration economies are primarily from large centers, 
not small ones. 
2.5.4 Diversity Effects 
Table 7 presents results on diversity effects from equation (4).15  Estimated 
results reveal that diverse centers have larger impacts on creation of new 
establishments than specialized ones, implying that diversity encourages growth.  For 
urbanization economies, the estimated elasticities using the coefficients of Table 7 
(the columns (1)) suggest that highly diverse centers increase birth density by 41.3% 
in Construction, 130.9% in Finance & Insurance, 53.1% in Professional Services, but 
                                                 




do not have significant effects in Administrative & Waste Services; Medium diverse 
centers raise birth density only in Administrative & Waste Services by 114.4%.  For 
localization economies, the estimated elasticities using the coefficients of Table 7 (the 
columns (2)) suggest that highly diverse centers do not have significant effects in 
Construction and Administrative & Waste Services sectors, but increase birth density 
by 147.1% in Finance & Insurance, and 48.7% in Professional Services; Medium 
diverse centers raise birth density only in Administrative & Waste Services by 87.8%.  
For both urbanization and localization economies, medium diverse centers only affect 
Administrative & Waste Services, while lowly diverse centers do not have significant 
effects on any of the four sectors. 
Diversity effects consist of both direct and indirect effects, which means 
centers with certain diversities could encourage births of new establishments directly, 
or encourage births by boosting agglomeration economies.  Coefficients of dummy 
variables for lowly, medium and highly diverse centers in Table 7 indicate that highly 
diverse centers have stronger direct effects than others.  After controlling for 
interaction terms, highly diverse centers gain positive and significant coefficients for 
Finance & Insurance and Professional Services sectors, in both columns (1) and (2).  
Most of medium diverse centers and all of lowly diverse centers have insignificant 
coefficients. 
Positive and significant coefficients for interactions between highly diverse 
centers and urbanization/localization economies imply strong indirect effects of 




the marginal effects of interactions increase in many sectors, accompanied with the 
rise in the significance.  They also indicate that highly diverse centers significantly 
promote urbanization and localization effects in most sectors.  Medium diverse 
centers promote urbanization and localization only in Professional Services, and 
lowly diverse centers do not have such effects across all four sectors.  Therefore, the 
effects I find in section 5.2 that centers foster agglomeration economies should be 




Table 6: Scale Effects of Employment Centers 
Model (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2)
-7.92E-08 4.81E-07 1.57E-07 -3.41E-08
(-1.28) (2.92) (1.12) (-0.33)
4.38E-07 3.66E-06 1.88E-06 6.51E-07
(0.77) (2.29) (2.62) (0.62)
6.27E-03 1.30E-04 3.97E-03 -1.12E-03 2.55E-02 2.77E-03 5.48E-03 1.97E-03
(1.20) (0.05) (0.24) (-0.13) (1.90) (0.42) (0.64) (0.45)
1.53E-03 1.25E-04 8.86E-03 7.15E-03 -2.11E-03 5.08E-03 2.83E-03 1.25E-03
(0.77) (0.09) (1.62) (1.87) (-0.42) (1.44) (0.88) (0.51)
1.95E-03 2.75E-05 1.49E-02 1.60E-02 4.85E-03 3.36E-03 2.90E-03 4.15E-03
(1.38) (0.02) (3.78) (4.90) (1.42) (1.00) (1.29) (2.00)
-6.73E-07 -1.49E-07 -1.92E-06 -3.06E-07
(-1.36) (-0.10) (-1.53) (-0.39)
2.45E-08 -7.83E-08 1.03E-06 9.06E-08
(0.18) (-0.23) (3.25) (0.41)
1.19E-07 -1.27E-07 4.99E-07 2.12E-07
(1.76) (-0.71) (3.21) (1.92)
-2.34E-06 1.41E-05 4.75E-06 -4.54E-07
(-0.67) (0.83) (0.61) (-0.08)
1.23E-06 2.74E-06 3.05E-06 1.81E-06
(1.01) (0.84) (2.31) (0.99)
2.71E-06 -9.24E-07 3.00E-06 1.46E-06
(3.11) (-0.54) (3.45) (1.27)
Log Likelihood 2189.80 2198.84 168.82 170.57 1469.63 1482.23 985.79 988.18
Uncensored 1017 1017 333 333 1112 1112 683 683
Total Obs. 3999 3999 3999 3999 3999 3999 3999 3999
County Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Summary Statistics
Large Centers * 
Urbanization
Small Centers * 
Localization
Medium Centers * 
Localization
Large Centers * 
Localization
Small Centers * 
Urbanization
Medium Centers * 
Urbanization
Construction Finance and Insurance Professional Services
Administrative and 
Waste Services







Large Centers (> 
100,000)
 






Table 7: Diversity Effects of Employment Centers 
Model (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2)
-8.56E-08 4.64E-07 1.76E-07 -4.11E-08
(-1.39) (2.85) (1.26) (-0.40)
4.18E-07 3.52E-06 1.94E-06 5.60E-07
(0.74) (2.21) (2.72) (0.54)
1.14E-02 1.91E-03 1.55E-02 5.00E-03 3.26E-02 -3.20E-03 1.74E-02 9.40E-04
(1.57) (0.38) (0.49) (0.25) (1.55) (-0.29) (1.30) (0.18)
-3.30E-03 -3.64E-03 1.25E-02 6.38E-03 -5.16E-03 5.48E-03 8.26E-03 6.00E-03
(-0.91) (-1.40) (1.29) (0.93) (-0.63) (1.05) (1.58) (1.82)
1.50E-03 3.65E-04 1.29E-02 1.41E-02 4.97E-03 5.22E-03 7.06E-04 1.80E-03
(1.39) (0.35) (4.19) (5.45) (1.85) (2.08) (0.40) (1.11)
-1.14E-06 -2.27E-06 -3.25E-06 -1.61E-06
(-1.70) (-0.77) (-1.66) (-1.29)
2.09E-07 -4.86E-07 1.35E-07 -5.19E-09
(0.91) (-0.78) (2.71) (-0.02)
1.27E-07 -8.54E-08 4.88E-07 2.41E-07
(1.94) (-0.50) (3.23) (2.24)
-6.14E-06 -2.69E-05 4.32E-06 -2.36E-06
(-0.71) (-0.59) (0.25) (-0.30)
4.39E-06 3.03E-06 2.62E-06 8.62E-07
(1.34) (0.30) (1.73) (0.42)
2.16E-06 -5.46E-07 2.81E-06 1.83E-06
(2.72) (-0.32) (3.41) (1.63)
Log Likelihood 2192.67 2197.67 190.84 197.69 1481.48 1488.35 993.10 999.50
Uncensored 1017 1017 333 333 1112 1112 683 683
Total Obs. 3999 3999 3999 3999 3999 3999 3999 3999
County Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Medium Diverse Centers 
* Urbanization
Summary Statistics
Highly Diverse Centers * 
Urbanization
Lowly Diverse Centers * 
Localization
Medium Diverse Centers 
* Localization
Highly Diverse Centers * 
Localization
Construction Finance and Insurance Professional Services
Administrative and 
Waste Services
NAICS 23 NAICS 52 NAICS 54 NAICS 56













2.6  Conclusions and Policy Implications 
Many studies have used refined data such as census tracts to examine 
localization and urbanization economies.  A conventional approach uses a fixed 
buffer distance (such as one or five miles) to measure the influence of local economic 
activities on the development of new firms, and receives positive evidences on at least 
one of them (localization and urbanization economies) if not both are present.  This 
study, however, finds that both localization and urbanization economies may be 
subject to overestimation if the effects of employment centers are not taken into 
account, particularly in large metropolitan areas.  It is found that both urbanization 
and localization effects consistently become smaller when the employment center 
dummy variable and interactive variables are included.  I believe that the irregular 
geographic shapes of employment centers are the primary reason for the potential bias 
from using fixed buffer distances to capture localization and urbanization economies 
(Fotheringham & Rogerson 1993; Fotheringham & Wong 1991).      
This paper concludes that the impact of employment centers on localization 
and urbanization economies can be substantial.  Urbanization effects decline by 51% 
- 245% whereas localization effects decline by 58% - 87% from inside to outside 
centers.  Finance & Insurance and Professional Services sectors are more likely to 
exhibit agglomerative effects than Construction.   
This study shows that effects of employment centers are affected by their 
characteristics such as size and industrial composition.  More specifically, large 




stronger agglomeration effects.  Highly diverse centers tend to attract more new 
firms, and foster stronger agglomeration effects than specialized ones. These 
conclusions are not surprising and are more or less consistent with the mainstream 
findings in the literature.   
The findings from this paper have two prominent policy implications.  The 
first is that size of centers matters.  Certainly negative consequences such as 
congestion costs increase with size, but the results of this study suggest that they may 
be outweighed by potential agglomeration economies so that overall impact will still 
be positive.  Economic development policy thus should favor further concentration of 
economic activities around existing activities.  The second implication is that 
industrial diversity matters.  Planning efforts such as coordinated zoning practice, 
policy initiatives and industrial incentives should target more diverse employment 
centers if there are not any strong and obvious sectoral externalities.  Although it 
should be cautious that findings from this study may not be applied to other states, the 
general approach developed should be.  That is, the research framework developed in 





Chapter 3: Job Loss and Housing Foreclosures – Evidence from 
the State of Maryland 
3.1 Introduction 
The understanding of determinants of a homeowner’s decision on mortgage 
default is of great importance to housing finance scholars/professionals and 
policymakers.  Attentions to mortgage defaults are also driven by the understanding 
of close interactions between labor and housing markets, which play critical roles in 
the wellbeing of city residents (Whitehead, 1999).16  Housing tenure, supply, equity 
and mortgage default have shown impacts on labor mobility, employment growth and 
employment outcomes.17  Meanwhile, fluctuations in labor market may affect the 
income flow of workers, and thus affect housing demand, price and mortgage 
payments.  Works by Reichert (1990), Baffoe-Bonnie (1998), Johnes and Hyclak 
(1999) and Hwang and Quigley (2006) find significant impact from employment 
change to housing price and stock. 
 One of the direct linkages from labor market to housing market is proposed by 
the “double trigger” theory on foreclosure (Riddiough, 1991).  According the theory, 
                                                 
16 The importance of labor market and housing market dynamics are associated with high urbanization 
rate, a fraction of total labor forces working in agricultural sector, and dominant residential land use. 
For specifically, urbanization in USA is 80 percent in 2010, agricultural sector employs about 2-3 per 
cent of USA’s labor forces, and residential land use accounts for up to 80 per cent of all lands 
(excluding roads and open space) in American metropolitan areas. 
17 For housing tenure on unemployment, see McCormick (1983), Hughies and McCormick (1991), 
Green and Hendershott (2001), Dohmen (2005), Battu et al. (2008), and Dujardin and Goffette-Nagot 
(2009); for negative equity on labor market flexibility, see Henley (1998); for housing supply on wage 
and employment, see Glaeser et al. (2006) and Saks (2008); for mortgage default on unemployment, 




negative equity is a necessary condition, but not a sufficient one for foreclosures. For 
a homeowner to decide to walk away from his/her property, a “trigger” event that 
causes liquidity constraint is essential.  Job loss is one of the main trigger events.  
Literature support this notion that the job loss triggers foreclosures, but find mixed 
evidence (Bajari et al., 2008; Foote et al., 2008; Danis and Pennington-Cross, 2008; 
Gerardi et al., 2009).  This is largely due to the fact that job loss is measured in much 
larger geographic areas than foreclosures, which may not reflect the true effect of job 
loss.18   
A fundamental challenge to examine the interactions between labor and 
housing markets is rooted in the spatial separation of workplace and residence. Unless 
data are aggregated into metropolitan areas in which both labor markets and housing 
markets are confined into the same geographic boundary, any analysis at smaller 
aggregate levels will encounter the challenge of geographic mismatches of job and 
residential locations.  For example, only 3.6 per cent and 43.8 per cent of workers 
work and live at the same census tracts and counties in Maryland, respectively. The 
spatial separation is substantial. In 2005, workers travel for 16 miles or 26 minutes on 
average from their homes to workplaces.19  Therefore, the employment fluctuations 
occurred in one site may affect housing markets miles away.   
 The objective of this paper is to examine the effect of job loss on foreclosures 
at the neighborhood (census tract) level.  In order to do so, a direct measure should be 
                                                 
18 For example, researches generally use state or county level unemployment rate to proxy the 
unemployment risk of individual borrowers. See the literature review in the second section of this 






developed first to connect labor markets to housing markets at the disaggregate level.  
Accordingly, I develop a job loss vulnerability index using the home-work 
commuting data to link labor markets (job changes) and housing markets 
(foreclosures) at the census tract level.  The index indicates the extent to which a 
worker may be affected by the job loss.  The value of the index increases with the 
share of workers to the places with job loss and with the size of job loss.  I believe 
that the index enables us to quantify the effect of job loss at a tract on foreclosures at 
other tracts that have commuters between them. The index also enables us to do so 
using secondary data, which is quite important given data available. I then develop a 
reduced form model to estimate the effect of job loss on foreclosures.   
 I proceed as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature on housing foreclosures. 
Section 3 presents the basic theoretical framework and econometric specification. 
Section 4 describes the data and variables. Section 5 presents job loss and 
foreclosures in Maryland. Section 6 discusses the results of the econometric analysis 
and their implications. Section 7 concludes. 
3.2 Literature 
Housing foreclosure has been extensively studied. Studies based on the put 
option theory pay particular attention to negative equity in foreclosure decisions and 
conclude that if the market value of a house is below the mortgage balance, the 
borrower should simply walk away and leave the house to the bank (Foster and Van 
Order, 1984; Quigley and Van Order, 1991; Quercia and Stegman, 1992).  Empirical 




exist at all.  Using individual loan data, studies show that only 4% - 8% of 
“underwater” borrowers eventually end up in foreclosures (Foster and Van Order, 
1984 and 1985; Vandell, 1992; Foote et al., 2008).20  This weak support to the theory 
of “ruthless” default is also found in Guiso et al. (2009) using survey data.  The 
literature implies that transaction costs are probably not enough to explain this 
contradiction (Vandell, 1995). 
Recent advances toward the understanding of foreclosure behaviors suggest 
that the negative equity is a necessary condition but not a sufficient one for 
foreclosures (Foote et al., 2008; Mayer et al., 2009). A distressed borrower with 
positive equity is always better off by selling his house, paying off the mortgage, and 
keeping whatever remains from the sale.  Underwater borrowers may not decide to 
default if they expect house price appreciation in future (Foote et al., 2008).  
Mortgage default may occur when negative equity reaches a certain level. For 
example, when borrowers are 50% underwater, Guiso et al. (2009) suggest 17% them 
would strategically default, while Buhtta et al. (2010) suggest 50%.   
Riddiough (1991) proposes the so-called “double trigger” theory to explain 
foreclosure behaviors. Under this theory, liquidity constraint is the trigger for a 
homeowner to decide to walk away from the property with negative equity, and the 
liquidity constraint is caused by job loss, divorce, or accidents that could generate 
cash flow problems.  The “double trigger” theory is theoretically supported by Elmer 
                                                 
20 Foster and Van Order (1984 and 1985) find that only 4.2% of borrowers with estimated loan-to-
value ratios of 110% or higher actually defaulted on their mortgages.  Vandell (1992) find only 5% - 
8% of borrowers with market loan-to-value ratios higher than 110% defaulted.  The Massachusetts 
loan data used by Foote et al. (2008) indicate that about 6.4% of borrowers having negative equity in 




and Seelig (1999). They show the linkage between financial and income shocks, 
insolvency, and mortgage default through a three-period theoretical framework.  
Empirical support for the “double trigger” theory is quite overwhelming.  Webb 
(1982) and Vandell and Thibodeau (1985) are among the early researches examining 
cash flow influences on default.  Webb finds that borrowers’ occupations with greater 
income variability are associated with higher delinquency rate, and Vandell and 
Thibodeau find small effect from equity, but important roles of income loss and social 
disruptions.  Foote et al. (2008) conclude that default occurs when two things happen 
simultaneously: negative equity and an adverse life event.  Buhtta et al. (2010) show 
that almost all observed defaults can be attributed to liquidity shocks when equity 
shortfall is less than 10% of the house value.  Elul et al. (2010) use credit card 
utilization rates to identify illiquidity, and find a significant impact.  
With regard to trigger events that cause cash flow problems, many studies 
have focused on job loss or unemployment which is likely the major immediate cause 
of income variability (Webb, 1982).  The only one research using individual survey 
data I have found is Herkenhoff (2012), who concludes that job loss makes someone 
8.2% more likely to default.  Bajari et al. (2008) find that a one standard deviation 
increase in the county-level unemployment rate is associated with 10% greater hazard 
of mortgage default, which is statistically significant but much smaller than the 
effects of other factors.21  Similar positive impact with small magnitude of the 
county-level unemployment rate on individual defaults/foreclosures is also found in 
recent literature including Foote et al. (2008), Buhtta et al. (2010), and Elul et al. 
                                                 




(2010). 22  Meanwhile, Gerardi et al. (2009) find it insignificant, and Towe and 
Lawley (2010) find it negatively associated with foreclosures.  Less support on the 
positive impact of unemployment on mortgage defaults or foreclosures is found if 
unemployment data is measured at larger geographic units (such as state or MSA).  
For example, Elmer and Seelig (1999) and Doms et al. (2007) find unemployment 
rate and employment decline at the MSA or state level are insignificant when some 
controls are included.  Ambrose and Capone (1998) and Danis and Pennington-Cross 
(2008) find higher state-level unemployment rate is associated with lower 
delinquency and default probabilities.  Elmer and Seelig (1999), Deng et al. (2000), 
Demyanyk and Van Hemert (2008), and Sherlund (2008) use the state-level 
unemployment rate, but find mixed results.   
It should be cautious in interpreting the mixed results of unemployment or job 
loss on foreclosures for the following reasons.  First, it may not be appropriate to use 
the state or MSA level unemployment data as they might miss much of the local 
variation in unemployment and thus the underlying effect on default (Sherlund, 
2008).  Quercia and Stegnan (1992) also indicate that using national, regional or local 
indices may not reflect events or changes in the individual circumstances of 
borrowers who default.  Second, the effects identified through aggregation may 
include broader consequences of living in a depressed metropolitan area.  For 
example, lenders in depressed areas may be under pressure from state and local 
governments, as well as financial regulators, to offer greater forbearance to defaults 
                                                 
22 Foote, Gerardi and Willen (2009) find that the default probability increases by 800% when the 
subprime mortgage is present, but only increases by 10% when the unemployment rate rise by one 




(Ambrose and Capone, 1998).  Third, using the mean of such large groups could 
substantially enlarge standard errors and make estimated coefficients insignificant 
(Tielemans et al., 1998).  Census 2010, for example, indicates that the average 
population is larger than 100,000 at the county level, and larger than 6,000,000 at the 
state level.  The measurement errors at these unemployment rates may also shrink the 
impact of unemployment to a large extent (Lindo, 2012).   
There are studies that examine factors such as loan characteristics, interest rate 
and moral constraints on foreclosures.  Loan characteristics and interest rate may 
matter, but are not the major driving force of foreclosures (Quercia and Stegman, 
1992; Vandell, 1995; Mayer et al., 2009).  Since ruthless defaults do not constitute the 
major part of foreclosures, the moral constraint and contagion effect may play 
secondary or small roles in foreclosure behaviors.  Consider the contagion effect as an 
example: a one unit increase in neighboring foreclosures increases the hazard of 
foreclosure by only 4% in Maryland (Towe and Lawley, 2010). 
3.3 The Model 
I use the framework developed by Bajari et al. (2008).  I assume that a 
borrower starts the mortgage at time t0 and decides whether to pay the mortgage at 


















where Vt denotes housing value at time t, and Lt denotes the outstanding principal on 
the mortgage.  Assuming constant loan-to-value ratio at t0 and similar interest rates 






generates the negative equity.  But the negative equity alone does not have strong 
explanation on mortgage defaults, and probably only serves as the necessary 
condition.  To make the default happens, trigger events are required to shrink 
borrowers’ financial liquidity and payment ability.  This is expressed as: 
0);()(  ttttttt PXTERPCY                                                                   (2) 
where Yt is income, Ct is necessary consumption, and Pt is mortgage payment.  
tt CY   is the disposable income after consumption that could be used for mortgage 
payment, and is a function of household attributes Xt and trigger events TEt such as 
unemployment, divorce and health problems.  Equation (2) makes it hard for a 
borrower to pay his mortgage normally, and equation (1) excludes the borrower’s 









HD                                              (3) 
Because Pt is a function of Vt0 if down payment ratio is given, the 







D , depending on housing 




neighborhood (census tract), according to the individual’s default function, I define 









F , where Ni,t denotes the number of borrowers in that 
neighborhood.   










2,10,                                            (4) 
where I use job loss at the neighborhood level as the primary trigger event (TEi,t) 
during my study period.  In this paper, I focus on job loss as the trigger event.  I 
therefore expect that the coefficient ( 1 ) is positive and significant. The coefficient 
2  is expected to be negatively significant.   
3.4 Data and Variables 
3.4.1 Data 
The question of job loss effect on foreclosures is examined in the State of 
Maryland.  I use data from several sources.  The first one is the foreclosure data 
obtained from Realty Trac, a private corporation specializing in collecting foreclosure 
records in the country.  This data contains individual foreclosure fillings from public 




2009.23  Each record contains the date of the filling, the physical address of the 
property, and foreclosure activities.  I geocoded these properties on GIS map 
according to their physical addresses.  Three types of foreclosure activities are 
recorded in the data: a notice of default, a notice of foreclosure sale (auction), and a 
bank-owned property (REO).  Many properties appear multiple times in the database 
under different activities.  I use the first foreclosure filling for an individual property 
as the beginning of the foreclosure process.24  In doing so, I eliminate multiple entries 
for properties with more than one foreclosure activities.  The foreclosure records are 
then aggregated to the census tract level. 
Two data sources are used for employment.  One is the Quarterly Census of 
Employment and Wage (QCEW) and the other is the Longitudinal Employer-
Household Dynamics (LEHD).  QCEW data are collected quarterly, containing over 
1.6 million establishments with information such as monthly employment, NAICS 
code, physical address, quarterly wage, ownership, etc.  All the employment covered 
by Unemployment Insurance and Unemployment Compensation for Federal 
Employees are included in this data, representing about 99.7% of all civilian 
employment in the United States.25  I geocoded the first quarter of 2005 and 2006, 
and the second quarter of 2007 and 2008 on GIS map.26  LEHD is an annual data 
published by U.S. Census Bureau at the block level, which covers 98 percent of 
                                                 
23 As a judicial state, Maryland’s foreclosure process is conducted through the court system.   
24 Some properties do not have a notice of default before auction or REO possibly because the data 
missed some fillings. So I use the first filling as the start of foreclosure process.  
25 See BLS website for QCEW data (http://www.bls.gov/cew/cewfaq.htm#Q01) as well as Appendix A 
in http://www.dllr.state.md.us/lmi/emppay/emplpayrpt2006.pdf 
26 This data is from Maryland's Department of Labor, Licensing, and Regulation, and is used under 
strict confidentiality rules.  The data I have include the first quarter in 2005 and 2006, and all the 




nonagricultural, private wage and salaried employment.27  It reports annual statistics 
from 2002-2009 at census block level after having adjusted the data for confidential 
protection. A key data from LEHD is its Workplace Area Characteristics (WAC), 
which documents the number of workers by their workplace location.28  I aggregate it 
to the census tract following the technical document’s suggestions (Anderson et al., 
2008).  The synthetic Origin-Destination (OD) data in LEHD indicate the number of 
workers living in tract i and working in tract j, similar to the commute data from the 
Census Transportation Planning Package (CTPP) 2000.  This type of home-work 
linkage data is used to construct an index (job loss vulnerability index, see the 
following section) that links spatially separated labor markets and housing markets at 
the census tract level.   
Other sources including Census 2000, Home Mortgage Disclosure Act 
(HMDA) database, and Equifax provide other explanatory variables in function (4).  
3.4.2 Variables 
The spatial separation of residential and employment locations is the 
fundamental in urban landscape. This spatial separation, however, imposes challenges 
in examining the linkage between labor and housing markets in general and between 
foreclosures and job loss in particular at small geographic units such as census tracts 
                                                 
27 LEHD data miss certain amount of public employment, especially federal employment (Anderson et 
al., 2008).  Because this sector did not have significant job losses during the recent depression, it 
should not affect much of my job loss estimates. 
28 The other two parts are: Residential Area Characteristic data (RAC), counting the number of 
workers by their residence location; and Origin-Destination data (OD), counting how many workers 
living in block i and working in block j.  WAC is real data, while RAC and OD are both synthetic data 




or blocks. In order to link foreclosure activities and job loss, I develop a job loss 












                 
                                                                   (5) 
where tiJL , is the job loss vulnerability at census tract i in time t; 1,, tjiC  is the number 
of workers who live at tract i and work at tract j in period t-1; tjD , is the number of 
job losses from t-1 to t at tract j; and 1, tjR  denotes the total jobs at tract j in period t-
1. 
I use three different measures as the proxy of job losses ( tjD , ) at census tracts. 
The first is net employment loss.  It proxies the extent of labor market bust and 
workers usually suffer higher unemployment risk when net employment loss expands 
(Reichert, 1990; Baffoe-Bonnie, 1998; Johnes and Hyclak, 1999; Hwang and 
Quigley, 2006).  The second measure for job losses is job destruction (Davis and 
Haltiwanger, 1999).  At each census tract, the job destruction represents employment 
losses summed over all establishments that contract or shut down between time t-1 
and t.  This measurement provides information on the job turnover within the census 
tract, and two census tracts with exactly the same employment change could have 
quite different job destructions and creations.29  Given the QCEW data I have, I 
compute job destruction during 2007 Quarter 2 – 2008 Quarter 2 and 2008 Quarter 2 
                                                 
29 Hall (1995) and Davis et al. (1996) find close connection between increases in job destruction and 
increases in unemployment rate, especially for workers who consider themselves permanently laid off.  




– 2009 Quarter 2.30  The difference between job destruction and job creation is the net 
employment change, as indicated by the following equation.    
Job Destruction = Job Creation – Net Employment Change 
The third measure for job losses is the job destruction due to firm closures.  
This actually captures a part of the job destruction discussed above.  I employ this 
measure to avoid the potential endogeneity, because a homeowner’s job loss and 
foreclosure could be both caused by other reasons including health problems and 
other accidents.  Job loss due to the closure of an establishment, however, should be 
considered as an exogenous shock (Kuhn et al., 2009). 
I collect a set of control variables used in (4).  They capture three kinds of 
factors: housing price change, subprime mortgages and household characteristics. 
Housing price depreciation could generate negative equity in mortgages, and is 
closely associated with the increase in mortgage defaults and foreclosures 
(Christopher et al., 2009).  Although unable to estimate housing equity due to the data 
limitation, this research controls for the 3-year house price change at the county level, 
using the data from Maryland Department of Planning.  I control for subprime 
characteristics because subprime mortgages are more likely to end up in foreclosure 
than prime purchase mortgages (Gerardi et al., 2009).  The subprime characteristics 
are represented by four different variables. The first one is the share of high cost and 
                                                 
30 The measurement over the same quarter or month helps avoid seasonal adjustments in 
establishments’ employment. I do not have the unique id of establishments in QCEW data before 2007, 




high leverage loans during 2004 – 2007, a period when subprime lending peaked.31  
This variable is expected to be positively correlated with foreclosures.  The second 
one is the share of originations that were second lien mortgages and the third one is 
the share of originations for refinancing during 2004-2006. Those two variable are 
created using HMDA data.  Multiple liens increase the combined loan to value ratio, 
and are found to increase mortgage defaults (Bajari et al., 2008; Elul et al., 2010).32  
The fourth variable is the credit score of borrowers, which is widely employed for 
subprime lending (Bajari et al., 2008; Foote et al., 2008; Gerardi et al., 2009).  I 
obtain credit scores (FICO) from Equifax, and measure the share of low-score 
borrowers with scores less or equal to 639 in 2006.  
I control the household characteristics at the census tract level, obtained from 
2000 Decennial Census.  I include a variable on the share of minority population, 
which is expected to be positively associated with foreclosures (Guiso et al., 2009; 
Sherlund, 2009; Chan et al., 2011); I include a variable on the share of residents with 
bachelor degree or above, which is expected to be negatively associated with 
mortgage defaults and foreclosures (Bajari et al., 2008; Sherlund, 2009); and I include 
a variable on average household size, which is expected to be positively associated 
with foreclosures (Bajari et al., 2008).  Finally, I include the median age.  It is 
                                                 
31 Only few subprime loans have been originated since mid 2007 (Lewis, 2011). High cost means 
annual percentage rate interest 3 percentage points or more over prevailing Treasury rates at the time 
of origination, and high leverage refers to the income leverage used by borrowers to obtain the loan 
(HUD, 2008).  This variable is created by HUD using HMDA database. 
32 The literature yields a mixed result on the impact of refinancing on foreclosures. Chan et al. (2011) 
find home purchase loans have higher default rates than refinances, possibly because refinancers have 
longer housing tenure. Similarly, Gerardi et al. (2013) indicate refinances decrease foreclosures.  
Conversely, Towe and Lawley (2010) find a positive relationship between refinance and foreclosure, 
and suggest that the ratio of refinance loans captures the extent to which households have extracted 




expected to positively correlate with foreclosures, because older people are more 
likely to have health problems that are one type of trigger events. 
Table 8 lists descriptive statistics of variables.  It shows that the three job loss 
indices are measured differently, but do not have quite large differences in terms of 
the mean and standard errors.  The housing price in Maryland started to decline 
during 2007-2008, but on average it was still higher than three years before.  
Subprime lending variables mostly cover the period of 2004-2006, when a large part 
of subprime mortgages were issued.  About 11.8 percent of loans were given to 
borrowers with low credit scores, 12.5 percent had high cost and high leverage, 14.1 
percent had second liens, and 58.1 percent were used to refinance.  Demographic 
characteristics indicate that almost 30 percent population in Maryland are African 
Americans, almost one third population hold the bachelor degree or higher, median 
age is 36.9, and average household size is 2.6.  Subprime lending variables, 




Table 8: Summary Statistics of Variables 
Variable Vintage Obs. Mean Std. Err.
Dependent Log (number of foreclosures)
October 2007 - October 
2009
2416 2.6577 1.1095
Log (net employment loss) 2007-2009 2416 4.0742 0.6184
Log (job destruction) April 2007 - April 2009 2432 5.2866 0.6547
Log (job destruction from the 
closure of establishments)
April 2007 - April 2009 2432 4.2835 0.6575
Three year county-level house price 
change
2007-2008 2416 0.2593 0.2074
Log (housing units) 2000 2416 7.3520 0.5803
Share of loans with low credit score 
(<639)
2006 2416 0.1183 0.1036
Share of high cost and high 
leveraged loans
2004-2006 2416 0.1248 0.0741
Share of loans that were second liens 2004-2006 2416 0.1410 0.0382
Share of loans for refinance 2004-2006 2416 0.5813 0.1054
Share of African Americans 2000 2416 0.2970 0.3216
Share of people with bachelor 
degree
2000 2416 0.3288 0.2036
Log (median age) 2000 2416 3.5967 0.1477








3.5 Foreclosures and Job Losses in Maryland 
House prices in Maryland are quite volatile in the past ten years.  They 
increased from 2001 to 2006, and started to decline around 2007.  The depreciation is 
strong in certain regions.  For example, in 2009, the median price declined by 28% 
from the peak in Dorchester County, 26% in Caroline County, and 21% in 
Washington County.  The housing price depreciation is accompanied by active 
foreclosures in the state.  Figure 2 shows that housing foreclosures have a breakneck 
increase from 2006 in the state.33  In 2006, only 3,366 properties started the 
foreclosure process with 3,475 foreclosure fillings, while in 2008, 25,254 properties 
started the foreclosure process with 37,606 fillings.   
                                                 






Figure 2: Housing Foreclosures in Maryland, 2006-2009 
Maryland has a moderate rate of housing price depreciation but ranks high in 
foreclosures in the nation.  From Maryland’s house price peak of 2007 Quarter 2, the 
5-year house price index is -21.72 in the state, close to the national average of -17.43 
(data published by Federal Housing Finance Agency).  In some states with highest 
foreclosure rates in the nation, such as Nevada, Arizona, Florida and California, their 
housing price indices was -55.15, -41.89, -40.29, and -40.09, respectively.  Maryland 
ranks 13th in foreclosure rate in 2009 in the nation (RealtyTrac, 2010).  The spatial 
variation of foreclosures is quite striking.  Figure 3 shows that high foreclosure rates 
mostly cluster in Baltimore City and regions around Washington D.C., including 
Prince George’s County and part of Charles, Frederick and Montgomery Counties.34   
During the similar period when foreclosures rose, job loss also expanded 
substantially.  In November 2007, the monthly unemployment rate in Maryland 
bottomed out at 3.1%, with 93,452 workers unemployed; in February 2010, the 
unemployment rate reached the peak of 8.6%, with 256,898 workers unemployed 
                                                 




(Figure 4, data published by BLS).  During the period of 2006 Quarter 1 – 2007 
Quarter 2, when the recent recession in labor market had not started, only 28% census 
tracts experienced the loss of total jobs, and these net losses were 13,019.  During 
2007 Quarter 2 – 2008 Quarter 2, however, 68% census tracts lost jobs, and these net 
losses increased to 132,809, ten times as big as the net loss one year before.   
 





Figure 4: Changes of Employment and Unemployment Rate in Maryland 





Figure 5: Employment Change, 2006 Quarter 1 - 2007 Quarter 2 






Figure 6: Employment Change, 2008 Quarter 2 - 2009 Quarter 2 
Data source: QCEW data. 
Figure 5 and 6 illustrate the wide spatial variation of employment changes in 
Maryland in those two different periods.  As shown in Figure 6, a lot of job losses 
clustered around Baltimore City and Washington D.C. suburbs.  A close comparison 
of Figure 2 and Figure 6 leads to conclude that 1) job losses and foreclosures usually 
do not occur at the same locations (census tracts); and 2) some sorts of geographic 
patterns or connections between locations of job losses and locations of foreclosures 




Table 9 presents the commuting pattern in Maryland, by the number of 
workplaces people travel to.  The amount of commute destinations is considerable.  
88.2 percent of tracts, accommodating 93.5 percent of workers, have more than 50 
workplaces to commute; 58.0 percent of tracts, accommodating 73.6 percent of 
workers, have more than 100 workplaces to commute.  On average, people living in 
one tract travel to 131 tracts for work.  Only one tract in Baltimore County does not 
have any residents commuting to other places, and workers living from one tract in 
Ann Arundel County commute to 284 tracts spread over eight states.35  The extent to 
which jobs and workers are spatially mismatched is inversely correlated with the size 
of geographic areas.  CTPP 2000 indicates that in Maryland, only 3.6 percent 
ofworkers live and work in the same tract, and 43.8 percent live and work in the same 
county.     









1-50 143 11.79% 165,127 6.47%
51-100 366 30.17% 507,728 19.90%
101-150 449 37.02% 1,004,202 39.37%
151-200 217 17.89% 703,286 27.57%
201-250 33 2.72% 144,252 5.66%
251-284 5 0.41% 26,261 1.03%
Total 1,213 100.00% 2,550,856 100.00%  
Data source: CTPP 2000 
Although significant portions of population and jobs in Maryland are located 
in areas within the D.C. metropolitan areas, the majority of Maryland’s workers have 
jobs located in the same state. For instance, nearly 83% of all Maryland’s workers 
                                                 
35 These states are Delaware, D.C., Georgia, Maryland, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, South Carolina 




hold jobs in Maryland (Table 10).  Out of Maryland’s workers who commute to 
outside Maryland for jobs, nearly two-thirds commutes to D.C.  It is interesting to 
find out that it was the presence of strong federal agencies and the economic stimulus 
program had helped D.C. to gain job growth during the 2008 economic recession 
while all adjacent states lost employment. For instance, from 2007 to 2009, number of 
jobs increased by 2.2 percent in D.C., while in surrounding states, it shrank by 5.4 
percent in New Jersey, 5.3 percent in Delaware, 3.5 percent in Maryland, and 3.4 
percent in Virginia(data published by BEA).  Those figures suggest that Maryland’s 
workers are less affected by job losses in other adjacent states. Excluding data/areas 
outside Maryland in my analysis thus will have little effect on empirical results and 
general conclusions with regard to the impact of job losses on foreclosures.  
Table 10: The Commute Pattern of Maryland’s Workers across States 
# of workers Share






West Virginia 4,721 0.2%
New Jersey 1,895 0.1%
Others 11,136 0.4%
Live in Maryland and work in…
 
Data source: CTPP 2000. 
Time lags should be considered while examining the connection between job 
losses and foreclosures because the foreclosure process usually starts several months 
after the mortgage default.  Lender Processing Services (LPS) data indicates 5-7 




notice is issued during 2006-2009, and the delay keeps rising over time (Herkenhoff 
and Ohanian, 2012).  At the beginning of 2008, the foreclosure started 233 days, or 
nearly eight months, on average after delinquency (Lewis, 2011).  As initial 
delinquencies should occur almost three quarters before the foreclosure process, I 
need to measure job loss with time lags when examining its impact on foreclosures. 
3.6 Results 
Different estimates on the effect of job losses on foreclosure are carried.  The 
first one is from OLS estimates.  The second one is from IV estimates in order to 
capture the attenuation bias from the classical measurement errors.  Finally I check 
the robustness of my results with different specifications of foreclosure delays as well 
as function forms.   
Two econometric issues arise.  One is associated with the choice between 
random effects vs. fixed effects.  In my estimates, I choose random effects for the 
following reasons.  First, most of my explanatory variables are time invariant, and 
their coefficients could not be estimated under fixed effects.  Second, most of the 
explanatory variables for foreclosure activity are already controlled, and I would 
expect very few, if any, missed variables that could be captured by fixed effects at the 
census tract level.  Third, choosing between fixed effects and random effects is a 
tradeoff between omitted variable bias and measurement error bias (Hauk and 
Wacziarg, 2009).  If the unobserved heterogeneity at the census tract level is trivial as 
I expect, and the measurement error could be significant as I will discuss later, then 




The other is related to the concern of endogeneity of job loss, since job loss 
can be caused by the melting down of housing markets.  Specifically, an increase in 
foreclosures may hurt local financial and real estate industries and cause local layoffs.  
Subprime crisis is one of the causes of the recent depression with historically high 
unemployment rate and layoffs (Tatom, 2010).  The causation from foreclosures to 
job loss, however, is less certain in this research since foreclosure process takes time 
(it lasts at least 5-7 month during 2008-2009) and many of distressed borrowers cured 
(Herkenhoff and Ohanian, 2012).  Thus I believe that using data on job losses 
occurred three quarters before the start of the foreclosure process helps us to avoid the 
potential endogenous problem.  In other words, the connection of foreclosures to job 
losses occurred three quarters ago is considered to be weak, if present.  In addition, 
job loss may be caused by regional trends that may be indirectly influenced by 
housing market bust, but less likely affected by foreclosure at microscope level such 
as census tract.  
3.6.1 OLS Estimates 
OLS estimation results with random effects are reported in Table 11. As 
expected, I find a positive effect of job loss on foreclosures.  The results show that the 
variable of job loss vulnerability index has positive and significant coefficients when 
it is calculated by three different job loss measures.  The coefficients suggest that a 
one per cent increase in the index value of job loss vulnerability by net employment 
loss is associated with 0.42 percent increase in foreclosures; a one per cent increase in 
the index value of job loss vulnerability by job destruction is associated with 0.47 per 




vulnerability by job loss due to firm closures is associated with 0.28 percent increase 
in foreclosures. Since job destruction contains more information on local job 
turnover, its higher elasticity than using net employment loss is expected.  The same 
logic holds for job loss by establishment closures.  Since job loss by firm closures 
represents a fraction of total job destruction, a smaller elasticity of job loss 
vulnerability is expected.  
Table 11: OLS Estimates of Effects of Job Loss on Foreclosures 
Coef. t value Coef. t value Coef. t value
Log (net employment loss) 0.4211 (6.55)
Log (job destruction) 0.46867 (5.41)
Log (job destruction due to 
establishment closure)
0.2841 (4.24)
County level house price 
change rate from 3 years ago
-0.4527 (-5.45) -0.4875 (-5.89) -0.5551 (-6.63)
Share of low FICO score 1.0879 (2.41) 1.1464 (2.53) 1.0069 (2.15)
Share of high cost and high 
leverage loans
1.7704 (0.80) 1.9777 (0.88) 1.9586 (0.87)
Share of originations that are 
second liens
8.5747 (5.16) 8.1925 (4.8) 8.6189 (5.02)
Share of loans for refinance 0.2057 (0.21) 0.1039 (0.1) 0.3099 (0.31)
Log (housing units) 0.5057 (6.91) 0.4710 (5.15) 0.6199 (7.22)
Share of African American 0.7764 (3.65) 0.8763 (4.15) 0.8124 (3.85)
Share of people with bachelor 
degree
-0.5559 (-2.56) -0.4652 (-2.12) -0.5679 (-2.58)
Log (average household size) 1.2449 (5.46) 1.2147 (5.28) 1.3569 (5.82)
Log (median age) 0.8990 (3.81) 0.8763 (3.72) 0.8471 (3.49)
Year dummy YES YES YES
obs. 2416 2416 2416
R-sq 0.59 0.56 0.55
Dependent variable: Log (number of foreclosures three quarters later)
(3)(2)(1)
 
Notes: t values are computed based on robust standard errors. There are 64 samples with zero 
foreclosure, and I arbitrarily use Log (foreclosure+0.5) for them when computing the dependent 
variable. 
Estimated results show that many of other explanatory variables have 
expected signs of coefficients at significant level of 99%.  The coefficient of housing 




magnitude of the coefficient implies that a one per cent increase in housing price 
depreciation rate is associated with 0.11-0.14 per cent increase in foreclosure.  This 
small effect of housing price rate change is consistent with the finding by Towe and 
Lawley (2010) in Maryland.  
Table 11 leads to mixed conclusions on the effects of loan characteristics.  
The FICO score has positive coefficients across three columns at the 5% significance 
level.  Increasing the share of borrowers with low credit scores by one percent will 
generate 0.12-0.14 percent increase in foreclosures.  The share of high cost and high 
leverage loans as well as the share of loans for refinance has an insignificant 
coefficient, respectively, suggesting these two factors have little impact on 
foreclosures in Maryland.  The second liens have a strong effect on foreclosures, 
whose coefficient implies that a one per cent increase is associated with 1.16-1.22 per 
cent increase in foreclosures.  This result is consistent with the findings by Bajari et 
al. (2008). 
As expected, foreclosure increases with the share of minority population, 
decreases with the share of higher education population, increases with average 
household size and median age. Those results are quite significant and robust.   
3.6.2 IV Results 
Measurement errors in job loss data need to be acknowledged for the 
following two reasons. First, spelling errors or missing physical addresses of 
establishments and the geocoding systems all produce blockcoding errors.  This type 




This happened to both LEHD and QCEW data.  Second, in order to protect 
confidentiality, LEHD adjusted the employment data by workplace and synthesized 
the OD matrix, and CTPP rounded up its commute data, which I use to connect  the 
workplace and the residence.  They together generate measurement errors in my job 
loss indices.  Both Angrist and Krueger (1999) and Hausman (2001) state that the 
classical measurement error that is uncorrelated with other regressors causes 
attenuation bias, or biases the estimated coefficients toward zero.  This bias could be 
addressed by employing an alternative noisy measure as an instrument, as long as the 
measurement errors in the instrument and the problematic variable are independent. 
I build instruments for job loss variables in the following way.  Since LEHD 
and QCEW data were geocoded independently by different entities using different 
software, and QCEW data was not adjusted for confidentiality, I believe these two 
data contain independent measurement errors in job loss by workplace.  Thus job loss 
indicators from LEHD could instrument for job loss indicators from QCEW, vice 
versa.  In order to capture measurement errors from the commute data that connect 
job loss at workplace to the corresponding residential neighborhoods, I use the OD 
matrix from LEHD as the instrument for the commute data in CTPP 2000.  The OD 
data is synthesized based on the real commute data, so it should be strongly correlated 
with the commute data in CTPP.  The two data sources are collected by different 
entities and use different methods in confidential protection, so I believe their 
measurement errors should be uncorrelated.36  The 2SLS estimation results with 
                                                 
36 Actually, if some correlation between the measurement errors still exists, I at least capture a large 
part of the attenuation bias. In that case, the estimated impact of job loss is considered as conservative, 




instrument are presented in Tables 12 and 13.  Table 12 presents the first-stage 
estimates, showing that the net employment loss from LEHD data is highly predictive 
to job destruction variables created by QCEW data; similarly, job destruction is also 
strongly correlated with net employment loss, supported by the large coefficient, t 
value, and F statistics.  Table 13 presents the results of 2SLS estimates.  It shows that 
the magnitude of the effects of job loss on foreclosure increases substantially after 
correcting the measurement errors, as expected.   Specifically, the elasticities of job 
loss vulnerability for net employment loss increased from 0.42 of OLS estimates to 
0.85 of 2LSL estimates; for total job destruction increased from 0.47 to 0.87; and for 
job destruction due to firm closure increased from 0.28 to 0.77, respectively.  These 
results suggest strong impact of job loss on foreclosures.  Other explanatory variables 
more or less lose significance in Table 13, because IV estimation generally enlarges 
their standard errors.  But most of the explanatory variables still keep the signs that 
are consistent with my expectations.  
Table 12: First Stage Estimates: Net Employment Loss as an Instrument for Job 
Destruction 
Coef. t value
Log (net employment loss) 0.7342 (54.88)
F-statistics
Log (job destruction from dead establishments) 0.8314 (52.34)
F-statistics
Log (job destruction) 0.7575 (54.88)
F-statistics 143.8
Use net employment loss as instrument for job destruction from 
dead establishments:
Use net employment loss as instrument for job destruction:
142.7
157.0
Use job destruction as instrument for net employment loss:
 




Table 13: 2SLS Estimates of Effects of Job Loss on Foreclosures 
Coef. t value Coef. t value Coef. t value
Log (net employment loss) 0.8520 (6.33)
Log (job destruction) 0.871853 (7.35)
Log (job destruction due to 
establishment closure)
0.7700 (7.19)
3-year county house price change 
rate
0.0327 (0.16) -0.0415 (-0.22) -0.2537 (-1.39)
Share of low FICO score 0.9700 (1.96) 1.0795 (2.17) 0.7602 (1.46)
Share of high cost and high 
leverage loans
1.8119 (0.81) 2.1821 (0.96) 2.3932 (1.03)
Share of originations that are 
second liens
8.1284 (4.49) 7.5108 (4.21) 7.8385 (4.36)
Share of loans for refinance -0.0891 (-0.09) -0.2265 (-0.22) -0.0303 (-0.03)
Log (housing units) 0.1700 (1.39) 0.1605 (1.47) 0.2460 (2.36)
Share of African American 0.8297 (3.88) 0.9987 (4.42) 1.0050 (4.43)
Share of people with bachelor 
degree
-0.5206 (-2.44) -0.3580 (-1.70) -0.5261 (-2.45)
Log (average household size) 1.0774 (4.63) 1.0578 (4.45) 1.2197 (5.28)
Log (median age) 1.0208 (4.18) 0.9575 (4.08) 0.9700 (4.00)
Year dummy YES YES YES
obs. 2416 2416 2416
R-sq 0.55 0.55 0.53
(1) (2) (3)
Dependent variable: Log (number of foreclosures three quarters later)
 
 
3.6.3 Robustness Check 
I use two different approaches to check the robustness of my estimates.  In the 
first approach, different time lags are used to reflect foreclosure delays whereas in the 
second approach different function forms are used to estimate function (4).  
Although the average time from the first delinquency to the start of 
foreclosure process is 7-9 months in my study period, there is a wide variation of this 
duration across counties.  For instance, in March 2011, the average duration from last 




County to 171 days in Montgomery County.37  To reflect the impact of inconsistent 
foreclosure delays, I use three different time lags. They are one-quarter and two-
quarter delays, and their results are compared with those of three-quarter delay.  
Table 14 reports the estimates with one quarter and two quarter lags.38  Comparing 
Table 14 with Table 11 and 13, I obtain two main findings.  The first one is that 
results are robust with regard to the effect of job loss on foreclosures.  All the key 
variables are positive at 99% significant level.  The second finding is that the 2SLS 
estimator yields larger coefficients than the OLS estimator.  This result is consistent 
for different time lags, leading to conclude that OLS estimates bias the job loss effect 
toward zero if measurement errors are present.  It is interesting to note that there is 
not a general pattern about the effects of job loss on foreclosure with respect to time 
lag/delay for foreclosure.  
                                                 
37 Maryland’s emergency bill signed in April 2008 requires lenders to wait 45 days after default before 
issuing an NOI, and 90 days after default before filling for foreclosures. See 
http://dllr.maryland.gov/finance/industry/pdf/noirptmar2011.pdf 
38 Because my foreclosure ends in the third quarter of 2009, I am unable to implement foreclosure 




Table 14: Robustness with Different Foreclosure Delays 













Dep: Log (number of foreclosures with the delay of…)
Log (job destruction due to establishment closure)
Log (net employment loss)
Log (job destruction)
Log (job destruction due to establishment closure)





Notes: other explanatory variables are controlled but not reported here.  t value based on robust 
standard errors are reported in the parenthesis. 
 
Table 15: Robustness with Linear Models, IV 2SLS 
Coef. t value Coef. t value Coef. t value
Net employment loss 0.4252 (9.20)
Job destruction rate 0.0256 (1.90)
Job destruction rate due to 
establishment closure
0.1636 (12.76)
County level house price 
change rate from 3 years ago
-18.4809 (-7.18) -16.3382 (-7.69) -7.0076 (-2.14)
Share of low FICO score -3.1697 (-0.32) 1.3910 (0.19) -6.9791 (-1.17)
Share of high cost and high 
leverage loans
99.7694 (8.06) 93.1863 (9.79) 99.7894 (13.53)
Share of originations that are 
second liens
79.5176 (3.92) 129.9382 (7.99) 117.5964 (10.16)
Share of loans for refinance -36.4996 (-4.91) -21.8674 (-3.67) -25.9601 (-6.04)
Share of African American 27.1486 (8.67) 20.1344 (7.95) 22.8426 (12.23)
Number of housing units -0.0003 (-0.25) 0.0072 (6.54) 0.0049 (10.34)
Share of people with bachelor 
degree
1.6063 (0.40) 2.8838 (0.95) 0.3534 (0.15)
Average household size 8.2857 (4.47) 12.9835 (9.15) 12.8556 (12.23)
Median age 0.7007 (4.91) 0.3082 (2.80) 0.4397 (5.45)
Year dummy YES YES YES
obs. 2416 2416 2416
R-sq 0.43 0.49 0.48
Dependent variable: number of foreclosures three quarters later
(3)(2)(1)
 





Table 16: Robustness with Poisson Model, IV GMM 
Coef. t value Coef. t value Coef. t value
net employment loss rate 0.0161 (14.75)
job destruction rate 0.0031 (6.03)
job destruction rate due to 
establishment closure
0.0056 (2.91)
County level house price 
change rate from 3 years ago
-1.2020 (-11.31) 0.0884 (0.81) -0.3058 (-3.45)
Share of low FICO score 2.2184 (5.18) 2.1100 (4.99) 2.1369 (4.88)
Share of high cost and high 
leverage loans
6.1663 (8.44) 6.5177 (8.56) 6.1840 (7.90)
Share of originations that are 
second liens
6.5378 (5.19) 7.0667 (5.43) 8.1503 (6.22)
Share of loans for refinance -2.1466 (-4.59) -1.9062 (-4.00) -1.5203 (-3.25)
Number of housing units 0.0000 (1.87) 0.0002 (2.35) 0.0003 (2.56)
Share of African American 0.5636 (5.52) 0.3808 (3.68) 0.3558 (3.00)
Share of people with bachelor 
degree
-0.0138 (-0.09) 0.0846 (0.62) -0.0316 (-0.23)
Average household size 0.3139 (4.57) 0.4697 (6.83) 0.5373 (7.06)
Median age 0.0278 (6.65) 0.0256 (6.01) 0.0225 (5.08)
Year dummy YES YES YES
obs. 2416 2416 2416
Dependent variable: number of foreclosures three quarters later
(3)(2)(1)
 
Notes: t values are computed based on robust standard errors. 
Table 15 presents estimates using a linear function form instead of the log-log 
form, in order to check whether different function forms significantly change my 
results.  Estimated results are basically consistent with my main findings.  First, I 
observe positive coefficients for the three job loss variables, though one of them in 
column (2) is not significant at 5% level.  A one percent rise in job loss indices by net 
employment loss, job destruction and job destruction from establishment closure 
increases foreclosures by 1.26 percent, 0.26 percent and 0.61 percent, respectively.  
Second, many other explanatory variables obtain expected coefficients with high 
significance.  Compared to results in Table 11, some loan characteristics including 




share of low FICO score, the share of people with bachelor degree, and housing units 
lose significance in some or all columns.  Other variables have the same signs with 
similar significance.  Finally, both of the log-log and linear function forms in Table 
11, 13 and 15 show strong prediction power.  The R square ranges from 0.53 to 0.59 
in Table 11 and 13, and 0.43 to 0.49 in Table 15(a). 
In Table 16 I use Poisson Model, because when the dependent variable is 
count data, the linear model may be biased.  After comparing these results with 
former ones, I obtain following findings.  First, all the three key variables are positive 
and significant at 1% level after I correct the potential bias from linear model.  A one 
percent rise in job loss indices by net employment loss, job destruction and job 
destruction from establishment closure increases foreclosures by 1.12 percent, 0.74 
percent and 0.49 percent, respectively.  Second, most of other explanatory control 
variables gain high significance compared to the log-log and linear function forms.  
Only the education variable is not significant.  Overall, the comparisons between 
these results imply that the strong job loss effect on foreclosures found in this paper is 
quite robust. 
3.7 Conclusions 
The interactions between labor market and housing market are of great 
importance to policy scholars and policy makers.  But the spatial separation of job 
locations and residential locations makes it difficult to examine the interactions.  
Based on job loss vulnerability index developed in this paper, I am able to link 




better understand the effect of job loss on foreclosures.  More importantly, this index 
is calculated from secondary data that are widely available throughout USA 
metropolitan areas and my approach can be applicable in similar researches in other 
regions.  
Using the job loss vulnerability index, this paper examines the effect of job 
loss on foreclosures at census tracts. Using both the OLS and 2SLS estimators, I 
conclude that the effect of job loss on foreclosures is strongly present in Maryland 
and the effect is found to be greater than other studies using state or county data on 
unemployment.  More specifically, my results show that a one percent increase in job 
loss increases foreclosures in corresponding residential neighborhoods by about 0.85 
percent.  I also find that measurement errors can lead to substantial attenuation bias 
toward zero.  The general conclusion of job loss effect on foreclosures holds when 
different measures of job loss are used.  To check the robustness, different approaches 
are used and I find that the general conclusion about the positive and significant job 
loss effect on foreclosures is upheld. For instance, this effect is unlikely subject to the 
time lag or foreclosure delay.  Finally, my study on the linkage between job loss and 
foreclosures can be used to support the “double trigger” theory.  Therefore, a 
reduction in trigger events such as job loss is critical to target at stable housing 




Chapter 4:  Do Off-Budget Revenues Have the Same 




Economic and fiscal decentralization in China in the past three decades has 
proved to be fruitful, as implied by outstanding performance of major macroeconomic 
indicators (such as GDP, per capita GDP and per capita income).39  Decentralization, 
however, can weaken fiscal control and raise local competition that may in turn 
increase off-budget activities, particularly when local officials face tight budgetary 
constraints (Thomas 2006; Peterson and Kaganova 2010).40  Off-budget revenues 
have grown so rapidly that they have become a critical source of public operations for 
subnational governments in China (Eckaus 2003). Land revenues, the largest source 
of off-budget revenues, for instance, were equivalent to 38.9 percent of total fiscal 
revenues in subnational governments in 2006.41  As intergovernmental transfers 
contribute 45 percent to total fiscal revenue on average, the ratio of land revenues to 
own tax revenues in subnational governments can be as high as 0.7.   
                                                 
39 See Lin and Liu (2000) on the relationship between fiscal decentralization and economic growth in 
China.  
40 “Off-budget” or the so-called “extra-extra budget” revenues refers to “out-of-system,” 
“unregulated,” “off-record,” and “self-raised” revenues in Chinese economic literature.  Those terms 
are nearly identical (Fan 1998). The off-budget revenues derive from public land leasing and rentals 
and revenues from direct government undertakings and it is difficult to determine the magnitude of the 
off-budget revenues because of lack of systematic recording in fiscal system (Eckaus 2003).  
41 The number increased to 65.9% in 2010 (source: Pan, J. and J. Li, 2011, Real Estate Bluebook, 




There are both benefits and costs associated with off-budget revenues.  On the 
benefit side, off-budget revenues increase revenue flexibility that facilitates policy 
adjustments in response to changing circumstances, which is widely anticipated in the 
process of rapid urbanization, as is the case in China.  Revenue flexibility is of 
particular importance when budgetary constraint is tight (Thomas 2006).  Revenue 
flexibility is also important for capacity building, so that local governments can make 
more effective and intelligent policy decisions.  There are many empirical studies that 
suggest a positive association between government spending and economic growth 
(Aschauer 1989; Barro 1990; Easterly and Rebelo 1993; Zagler and Dürnecker 2003; 
and Zhang and Zou 1989).42  
On the cost side, off-budget activities can cause distortions on supply and 
demand in the local economy and erode fiscal control, damaging the effectiveness of 
government budgeting.  A weakening of fiscal control undermines the role of 
budgeting in managing the economy and formulating public objectives and priorities 
(Schick 2007).  Off-budget revenues are raised and used ad hoc, without the rigorous 
fiscal scrutiny that the tax structure is normally subject to.  The lack of accountability 
and transparency associated with off-budget revenues leads to potential fraud, abuse, 
corruption, and the boondoggle of public resources (Bennett and DiLorenzo 1983; 
Ding 2007; Ma 2009; and Liu 2010).  Furthermore, the fiscal risk of local government 
increases with off-budget revenues (Liu 2010).   
                                                 
42 A few empirical studies, however, documents a negative correlation between capital expenditure, 
particularly in public investments in transport and communication, and real per capital GPD growth 




Despite the importance to public policy and management, few empirical 
studies systematically examine the behaviors of off-budget activities largely due to 
the data unavailability (Joulfaian and Marlow 1991; Kraan 2004; and Schick 2007).  
Bennett and DiLorenzo (1982) implicitly support the notion that fiscal pressure would 
lead to the development of off-budget activities, based on a study on five states in the 
USA that exacted tax or expenditure limitations on local governments.  Marlow and 
Joulfaian (1989) provide evidence that the size of off-budget activities is a function of 
the demand for total government activity.  They also argue that local governments 
evade expenditure limitations, which may be caused by withering fiscal revenues of a 
declining economy or the regulation-imposed tax base shriveling, by placing 
governmental expenditures off-budget.43  In a subsequent study, Joulfaian and 
Marlow (1991) find that, local governments suffering from strong constraints on 
fiscal budgets, or low levels of fiscal decentralization, can induce a large amount of 
off-budget activities as the substitution, and thus have stronger fiscal autonomy than 
it appears.  Berument (2002) concludes that off-budget items have larger 
expansionary effects on the economy than budgetary items using Turkish national 
monthly data from 1988-2002. 
Even though there are studies that show off-budget activities across Chinese 
cities are substantial (Ding and Song 2009; Liu 2010; Zhan 2011), the literature is by 
and large silent on expenditure behaviors and efficiency of public sectors.  A few 
empirical studies focus on off-budget activities’ consequences and association with 
fiscal decentralization.  The work by Eckaus (2003) is perhaps the only published 
                                                 
43 The 1993/1994 fiscal and tax reform in china, for instance, substantially altered tax revenue sharing 




paper examining the consequence of off-budget revenues in China by performing 
regression analysis on provincial data.  Eckaus concludes that (1) off-budget revenues 
may impair the economic growth potential, but the magnitude of the impact is small 
and may increase with the economy; (2) there is no evidence suggesting that off-
budget revenues are developed to correct market failures and to address income 
inequalities; (3) the off-budget revenues are an important source in supporting 
primary and secondary schools.  Jin, Qian and Weingast (2005) find that subnational 
governments have an independent and discreet power in disposing off-budget 
revenues, implicitly suggesting that fiscal autonomy grows along with fiscal 
decentralization.44  Work by Zhang and Zou (1998) and Jin and Zou (2005) show the 
importance of including off-budget activities in measuring the fiscal decentralization.  
Zhan (2011) explains that economic development and political stability are primary 
driving forces behind the central intervention in local off-budget practices.  
This paper empirically examines expenditure patterns of off-budget revenues 
by asking two related research questions.  The first is whether off-budget revenues 
affect the size and performance of public sector activities; and if so, what kinds of 
public sector activities are affected.  The second question is whether there is a 
crowding out effect of off-budget revenues on budgetary expenditure.  These 
questions are examined using three different estimations.  The first is an accounting 
type regression analysis, which is used to explain the expenditure behaviors of 
budgetary revenues.  The second is to estimate a demand-supply type of model to 
examine the crowding out effect of off-budget revenues on budgetary expenditures.  
                                                 
44 Spending guidelines on land revenues have been developed since 2007 and more proceeds from land 




The third is to estimate the size and performance of public sector activities with 
regressors of off-budget and budgetary revenues along with other control variables.   
The paper is organized as the follows. Section 2 illustrates the fiscal pressure, 
land revenues, and urban development in China in general. Section 3 presents the 
model.  Section 4 describes the data and variables while Section 5 discusses and 
interprets estimation results.  Section 6 makes final remarks and draws conclusions. 
4.2 Fiscal Pressure, Land Revenues and Urban Development in China 
Off-budget revenues are usually driven by fiscal pressure, political motivation 
and a desire for flexible spending power by local governments.  The former provides 
incentive for local governments to seek alternative sources to increase revenues, 
whereas the latter is important when the promotion of local officials is dependent 
upon local economic performance that can be enhanced by local spending powers.    
4.2.1 Fiscal Pressure 
Before 1993, the fiscal situation of subnational governments was better than 
that of the central government.  The central government had been running a small but 
consistent fiscal deficit while subnational governments had been running a small but 
consistent fiscal surplus for most years (they had deficits only in six out of sixteen 
years from 1978 to 1993).45  However, 1994 marks a turning point. After that year, 
the annual growth rate of the fiscal balance for both the central government and 
subnational governments are extraordinary, but in different directions (Figure 7).  The 
                                                 
45 There were only two years in which the central government’s fiscal situation was better than that of 




former has rapidly rising fiscal surplus whereas the latter ran into enormous deficits 
especially starting in 2001-2002 when fiscal pressure on subnational governments 
began to mount.  
 
Figure 7: Fiscal Balance (100 Million RMB) 
Data Source: China Statistical Yearbook 
There is no systematic data available that reflects the magnitude of fiscal 
deficit at the city level.  As a result, I use the ratio of intergovernmental transfers over 
city’s own tax revenue as an indicator.  For the 285 cities studied, the ratio steadily 
grew from just 1.10 in 1999 to 1.94 in 2006 (Figure 8).  The trend of a rising 
intergovernmental transfer ratio is consistent for all city sizes except super-large 
cities.  It is worth noting that the ratio for super-large cities declined while it 
increased significantly for small cities and towns.  This suggests that small cities and 




motivated by the preference for fiscal equalization over city size.46  For large and 
medium sized cities, the ratios were close to the national average and their trends 
resembled the nation’s pattern.  
 
Figure 8: Ratio of Intergovernmental Transfer over Local Own Revenue 
Data Source: China County Public Finance Statistical Yearbook 
4.2.2 Land Institution and Land Market Development   
The importance and dominance of land revenues in city finance has a lot to do 
with the unique land institution settings that empower subnational governments in 
land assembling and land markets.  The following stylized facts illustrate the unique 
land institutions in China (Ding 2003; 2007).  
                                                 
46 Fiscal equalization may also manifest in the trend of regional differentiation.  There was little 
variance of the ratio of intergovernmental transfers over own revenues across regions (East, Central, 
and West) in 1999. But regional gaps started to increase since 2001.  The ratio of transfers over own 
revenues in the west was about 2.85 times as big as in the east in 2006 whilst it was 1.77 times as big 




 Land ownership is geographically divided.  Land in cities (including 
towns) is owned by the state while land in rural areas is owned by 
collective communes residing on it. 
 Land Use Rights system (LURs) introduced in late 1980s, which virtually 
is land leasing system, is applied to only land in cities and towns.  That 
means land use rights and ownership cannot be separated in rural areas.47  
Land markets, which are land use rights markets, exist in cities and towns, 
not in rural areas.  
 Use rights of state owned land can be leased out to developers and 
individuals who must pay land conveyance fees in a lumpy and upfront 
fashion.  Leasing periods range 40-70 years, depending on land use types.  
Acting as the representative of the state, cities and countries are principle 
agents to lease land use rights as well as the beneficiary of land 
conveyance fees and land proceeds.  Since land conveyance fees are 
virtually a sum of 40-70 leasing prices, the size of land revenues is 
remarkable.    
 Because ofConstitution’s ban on land development on a collectively 
owned land, in which the ownership must be converted via land 
requisition becomes a prerequisite for land development. 48  Acting as the 
State’s representative, city and county governments are only authorized 
                                                 
47 Limited access to land use rights on collectively owned land is permitted for the development of 
towns and village enterprises.  





entities in land requisition, making them a monopoly-like agent in land 
supply for urban development. 
Two main drivers for the rapid increase in land transactions of urban land 
markets are fiscal pressure and the desire for flexible land revenues.  The 
development of land markets in China is characterized by three distinct periods.  The 
first period begins with the adoption of LURs to 1999, marked by rapid development 
of land leasing activities but not land prices.  For instance, there were 52,086 lots of 
5,588 hectares for a unit price of around 480,000 per hectare in 1993.  They grew at 
annual growth rates of 28.53 percent and 55.55 percent for a number of lots and total 
leased areas, respectively while land prices grew at a much lower pace, only 4.39 
percent of the annual growth rate from 1993 to 1999.49  The second period runs from 
1999 to 2003 in which land prices skyrocketed.   The annual growth rates for the 
number of lots and total areas were similar to the previous period, but land prices 
changed at an annual growth rate of 42 percent, ten times more the previous period.  
Unit land price increased from 660,000 RMB per hectare in 1999 to 2.68 million 
RMB per hectare in 2003.  The third period is from 2004-2007 in which land markets 
were adjusted by a national effort to cool off land markets. The number of lots 
declined consistently at an average annual growth rate of -23 percent while the total 
areas leased declined from 2003-2005 and then resumed to grow from 2005-2007.  
Unit land price rose at about 18 percent of the annual growth rate.   
                                                 




4.2.3 Off-budget Revenues, Land Revenues, and Urban Infrastructure Financing 
The off-budget expenditure remains by and large unreported.  Despite 
enormous efforts and substantial progress on curbing off-budget levies, governments 
continue to raise large amounts of “self-raised funds” to support rising demand from 
industrialization and urbanization.  
Off-budget revenues take different forms, ranging from fees and levies, 
commercial incomes, revenues from asset sales (not land), and land revenues from 
public land sales and rents.  Although the number of financial sources for off-budget 
revenues (all others except land) is significant, their total size is not; particularly 
compared to land revenues which are the largest and most dominating source.  Land 
revenues account for more than 80-90 percent of total off-budget incomes (including 
uncounted ones) for subnational governments, even taking into account the fact that it 
is difficult, if not impossible, to count all off-budget revenues.   
Land revenues were only 2.69 billion RMB in 1993, but soared to 52.17 
billion RMB in 1999, a remarkable annual growth rate of 63.91 percent. Land 
revenues increased at a much higher rate in the period from 1999-2003, growing to 
1112.71 billion RMB in 2003.  That is equivalent to a 115 percent of annual growth 
rate.  
The importance of land revenues to local public finance is best illustrated in 
comparison to budgetary revenues.  Figure 9 shows that land revenues were less than 
20 percent of city own revenues before 2001.  But they quickly jumped over 50 




increases with city size.  For super-large and large cities, for instance, land revenues 
were equivalent to 60-75 percent of city own revenues during 2003-2006 while the 
ratios were about 47-55 percent for medium cities and less 36-43 percent for small 
cities and towns. These figures were consistent with others studies that show land 
revenues were equivalent to 60 percent of total revenues at the city level.50   Those 
patterns are consistent with other findings.  Proceeds from land leasing in Beijing and 
Shanghai, the two largest cities in China, for instance, were equal to 40-50 percent of 
total fiscal revenue in 2009 (Liu 2010).  
 
Figure 9: Ratios of Land Revenue over Local Own Revenue 
Data Source: China County Public Finance Statistical Yearbook and China Land Resources Yearbook. 
These numbers are more impressive taking into account the fact that the 
majority of land revenues were generated from just a fraction of total leased land..  It 
was not until 2004 when the State Council mandated that all land should be leased out 
through auction, open bidding and tender regardless of the type and purpose of land 
                                                 




development.  Before 2004, only commercial development including commercial 
housing was leased through a competitive land market while other types of land uses 
were arranged through negotiation.  Land leased to commercial development was a 
small fraction of total leased land.  For instance, land areas that were leased for 
commercial uses through auction, open bidding, and tender accounted for less than a 
quarter of total leased land in 2000-2001.  Land was usually provided to industrial 
development at either a much lower (than land market) cost or free of charge in order 
to boost investments, businesses, and tax bases at local levels (cities or counties).  
 The rapid growth of land revenues is jointly caused by (inflated) demand for 
housing and monopolistic operations of local governments in land leasing and land 
taking.  The average price difference between payments to peasants in land 
requisition and prices charged to developers are in the order of a factor of 10-20.  For 
instance, in one village in Fujian province, the local government paid about 10,000 
RMB per mu to farmers and sold to developers for 200,000 RMB per mu if zoned 
industrial or for more than 750,000 RMB per mu if zoned residential (Investigating 
Group of Land Acquisition Reform of Ministry of Land and Resources 2003).51  Land 
revenues dropped in the period of 2003-2005 but resumed growth in 2005-2007. 52   
Land revenues largely go to finance capital projects, particularly urban 
infrastructure in spatial expansion areas.  Financing urban infrastructure through land 
leasing and bank loans securitized on land and property valuation accounts for 80–
                                                 
51 Mu is an area unit, which is 666.67 square meters. 
52 Total land conveyance fees dropped in 2008, reflecting the impact of the global economic crisis, but 
increased in 2009 and 2010.  Land revenue dropping in 2003-2005 is largely because of the mandatory 
halt of land leasing by the State Council to cool off over-heated investments and economy in 2004.  




90% of infrastructure financing by subnational governments in China.53  That is to 
say, cities can direct proceeds from public land leasing to finance urban infrastructure 
or use land as collaterals to borrow money.  A survey shows that land financing 
directly (public land leasing) and indirectly (land used as collateral) accounted for 95-
100 percent of the construction of urban spatial expansion in 2005 for Shaoxing and 
Jinhua in Zhejiang province (Ding 2007).54  Land based infrastructure financing 
creates outstanding off-budget government liabilities that are more than 30 percent of 
GDP (Liu 2010), and most of the liabilities are related to land collateral.55   
4.3 The Model 
Three different models are estimated. The first model, serving the purpose of a 
reference, is an accounting model to estimate marginal share of each budgetary 





ijt uRkhE                                       (1) 
where bitR denotes the total budgetary revenues (including city own revenues and 
intergovernmental transfers) in city i at year t, bijtE denotes budgetary expenditure in 
expenditure item j, ih and tk  denote city and year fixed effects, and ijtu  is the 
                                                 
53 World Bank and Development Research Center of the State Council of China (2005). 
54 Both cities were fast growing in late1990s and beginning of 21st century.  Shaoxing doubled her 
population in eight years (1998-2006) while Jinhua tripled. 
55 Number of cities unlocking land values to finance urban infrastructure increases worldwide 
(Peterson 2009). 
56 It is mandated that subnational governments should maintain a fiscal balance in which both deficit 
and surplus are zero.  So in theory, total revenue and total expenditure should be same.  In practice, 
however, total revenue and total expenditure is different partly because of fiscal imbalance and partly 
because of revenue remittance to upper level governments in China.  Both total revenue and total 




disturbance term.  Since this model captures the accounting sheet of a budgetary 
report, it is expected that all coefficients of expenditure items positive and significant 
to at least the 0.05 level. Because of the accounting nature of the balance sheet, it is 








ijt RRE   . 
The second model, a demand-supply type, is developed to estimate the 
existence and magnitude of crowding out effects of off-budget expenditure on 







ijtijt XRFEEE                                                                                      (2) 
where ijtE  is the total government expenditure on item j in city i at time t, and 
nb
ijtE  
denotes off-budget expenditure; ijtX  contains city characteristics that influence local 
preference and demand for item j.  )(F
 
is a demand function for public good i 
controlled by total revenues. Equation (2) says that all government services demanded 
from individuals and the private sector are supported by total expenditures, which are 
the sum of budgetary and off-budget revenues.  
                                                 
57 I assume public expenditure on each category in China is determined by both government revenue 
and local characteristics.  One way to think of this is, suppose the share of public expenditure on item j 
is determined by local features, i.e., )(XG
R
E j  , after transformations I get 




Assuming that a fraction of off-budget revenues, denoted by j , goes to each 
expenditure item, I have nbitj
nb





ijt RXRFE  ),(                                                       (3) 
If there is a crowding out effect, it is expected that j  will be positive.    





ijt uXRRkhE   21                                      (4) 
To address the potential issue of heteroscedasticity all variables in (4) are normalized 
by population.  It is expected that j1 >0, as government expenditure increases with 
total government revenue; j2 may be insignificant if there is not a crowding out 
effect and significantly negative if there is. 
The third model is to establish a statistical relationship between off-budget 





itjtiijt ZRRkhO   1343                                                   (5) 
where ijtO  denotes the growth of the size or performance of public sector activities j 
from t-1 to t in city i;  1ijtZ  is a vector of control variables; and ijt  is the disturbance 




I expect that j3 is positive and significant at least at 0.05 level regardless the type j 
of the size or performance of public sector activities. I break public sector’s activities 
into two types according to their nature of finance. The first type needs a reliable 
revenue stream and cannot (and should not) be financed by volatile off-budget 
revenues (e.g. school teachers in primary and secondary schools and employment in 
the public sector etc.).58  The second type of the size or performance of public sector 
activities (such as library books and infrastructure) can increase in a lumpy fashion so 
that off-budget revenues can finance it.  Therefore, I expect (1) i4 is not significant 
for the first type of the size or performance of public sector activities; and (2) i4 is 
significant for the second type if it is correlated with off-budget revenues and is 
insignificant if not.  That is, the coefficients of i4 by different type of public sector 
activities can be either significant or insignificant. I then infer expenditure 
behaviors/preferences of off-budget revenues by examining i4 . Without expenditure 
data on off-budget revenues available (this will be true in the foreseeable future), I 
believe this indirect approach helps us better understand the behavior of off-budget 
revenues.  
4.4 Data and Variables 
My empirical analysis is based on panel data consisting of 285 cities for the 
period of 1999-2006.  The panel data is constructed from four different statistical 
yearbooks of 2000-2007 covering years of 1999-2006.  The first data source is the 
                                                 
58 Pre-higher education schools include elementary, secondary (middle), and high schools in China.  





China City Statistical Yearbooks, which provide city characteristics such as 
population, GDP, fixed investments, employment, etc.  The second one is the China 
Urban Construction Statistical Yearbooks (UCS), providing data on urban 
infrastructure, including paved road, urban roads and squares, open space, sewers, 
streetlights, etc.  The third source is the China County Public Finance Statistical 
Yearbook (CPFS), containing detailed budgetary revenue and expenditure 
information by category, at both the city and county level.  The fourth source is the 
China Land Resources Statistical Yearbook, containing information on public land 
leasing including land conveyance fees at the city level. 
Budgetary expenditure items are organized by the following seven categories: 
Capital Construction, Education, Social Security, Administration, Agriculture, Police 
and Judicial Departments, and Miscellaneous Expenditures.59  Those seven categories 
are used in my estimations.  The total amount of budgetary revenues ( bitR ) is the sum 
of local tax revenues plus intergovernmental transfers while off-budget revenues 
( nbitR ) are approximated by land conveyance fees.  
There are two kinds of variables used to determine the demand side of the 
public sector. One kind is a universal factor such as GPD per capita and population 
included in all estimates across activity measures.  It is expected that per capita public 
sector demand increases with GDP per capita and decreases with population size 
(Shelton (2007).   The other kind of variables is specific and exclusive to each of 
                                                 
59 Excluding others, there were eight expenditure categories before 2002 (including 2002), and eleven 
after 2003 (including 2003). Seven categories used in this paper are comparable throughout the 




activity measures.  For instance, manufacturing GDP is a factor of urban 
infrastructure but not for primary education or social security while the number of 
student enrollments is a key factor in the determination of the number of teachers but 
not for urban infrastructure.   
Public sector activities are measured in the following areas: school teachers, 
number of buses, library books, sewer, water pipelines, sewage treatment capacity, 
land used for public facilities, urban paved road, urban road and public squares, inter-
city transportation, and open space.  
Table 17 presents descriptive statistics.  It shows that, on average, 53.4 
percent of total fiscal revenues were collected and retained by cities, while 89.3 
percent of total expenditures were spent on local activities.  Local fiscal revenues 
could finance only 64.9 percent of local public goods.  Education is the largest 
expenditure item comprising 13.7 percent of total budgetary revenues.  
Administration accounts for 8.44 percent, followed by Capital Construction (7.69%), 
Police & Judicial Dep. (5.87%), Agriculture (4.70%), and Social Security (4.13%). 
On average, 45 percent of total expenditure is not classified into any categories in the 
budgetary reporting sheet.  Capital Construction has the largest variation across 
prefectures.  Shanghai paid 31 billion RMB and Shenzhen paid 10.3 billion RMB in 
2004.  The land revenue was equivalent to 40 percent of local own revenues, or 26 
percent of local expenditures.  The ratio of land revenues to local own fiscal revenues 




Table 17: Summary Statistics of Fiscal Data, 1999-2006 
Obs. Mean Std. dev Share (%)
Local Own Revenue 2274 298752.9 807296.3 53.38
Total Revenue 2274 559655.8 1141581.0 100.00
Local Expenditure 2274 460623.6 963758.4 89.28
Total Expenditure 2274 515951.5 1065230.0 100.00
Education 2274 76730.3 120262.4 13.71
Administration 2274 47232.8 59649.7 8.44
Capital Construction 2274 43023.4 181876.9 7.69
Police & Judicial Departments 2274 32858.9 68093.4 5.87
Comprehensive Agriculture 2273 26306.3 33211.6 4.70
Social Security 2274 23088.7 48494.8 4.13
Miscellaneous expenditures 2273 211122.5 494771.8 37.72
Others 2274 99032.2 201797.9 17.70
Off-budget 
Revenue
Land Revenue 2249 134594.1 379373.2
Teachers for Primary Education 1933 0.011 0.061
Government Departments Employment 1989 0.005 0.089
Public Institutions Employment 1880 -0.002 0.660
Land for Highways 2279 0.042 0.114
Land for Railroads 2157 0.023 0.189
Urban Paved Roads 1956 0.112 0.201
Urban Roads & Squares 1932 0.100 0.307
Land Used to Facility Inter-city Transport 1933 0.027 0.371
Greenland 1931 0.091 0.433
Land for Rural Roads 2279 0.004 0.104
Street Lights 1942 0.177 0.328
Sewer 1948 0.088 0.225
Sidewalk 1939 0.087 0.306
Bus 2109 0.077 0.230
Library Books 1886 0.045 0.405
Water Pipelines 1959 0.074 0.310
Sewage Treatment Capacity 1291 0.131 0.542
Land for Public Facilities 1917 0.069 0.378
Population 2383 411.03 290.35
Population share of city proper 2346 0.32 0.24
GDP per capita 2383 11158.76 14055.46
GDP growth in the 2nd ind. 2374 1.14 0.13
GDP share of the 2nd ind. 2380 0.45 0.11
GDP share of the 3rd ind. 2380 0.35 0.08
Teacher / student 1929 526.40 100.12
Student in primary education p.c. 1932 0.16 0.03
Unemployment p.c. 2380 50.21 58.90
Government retirees p.c. 1933 64.90 25.02
Log (share of urbanized population) 2558 -0.61 0.48
Log (student growth rate in past 3 years) 1932 -0.01 0.08
Log (population growth rate in past 3 years) 1992 0.09 0.22
Log (built-up area growth rate in past 3 years) 1990 0.17 0.27
















Log growth rate 
of…
Notes: in the last column, I compute the share of local own budgetary revenue in total budgetary 
revenue, local budgetary expenditure in total budgetary expenditure, and local expenditure by 




4.5 Empirical Results 
4.5.1 Budgetary Expenditure Behaviors   
The accounting relationship between budgetary expenditures by items and 
total local budgetary revenues is estimated by the equation-by-equation OLS 
estimator with two-way fixed effects that help to correct for unobserved 
heterogeneities across cities and omitted variables.  In doing so, the estimate issue of 
correlated error terms across equation ( 0][ ,, 

kihiE  for the same prefecture i when 
item h≠k) is dealt with.   
Table 18 reports estimated results of equation (1).  Interpreting the table 
suggests the following findings, as expected.  First, all expenditure items have 
positive and significant coefficients at the 0.01 level.  Second, the sum of all 
coefficients is expected to be equal to 1 and the Chi-square test cannot reject the null 
hypothesis of unitary value of summed coefficients.  Third, the sum of the 
coefficients of the six major expenditure items is about 45.6 percent.  Finally, the 
model performs well for all items indicated with a high explanatory power of the 
independent variable.  Budgetary revenue can explain the variance of expenditure by 




Table 18: Marginal Preferences of Expenditure of Budgetary Revenues 
R-square
Capital Construction 0.112*** (3.58) 0.98
Education 0.093*** (20.61) 0.98
Social Security 0.027*** (2.96) 0.79
Admin. 0.074*** (13.04) 0.97
Police & Judicial Dep. 0.070*** (9.93) 0.98
Agriculture 0.025*** (3.48) 0.87
Miscellaneous 0.468*** (11.47) 0.97
Others 0.131*** (6.66) 0.90
Total Budgetary Revenue
 
Notes: both city and year fixed effects are controlled. 60  The heteroskedasticity-robust t values reported 
in the parenthesis.  * denotes significance at 10 percent level, ** denotes significance at 5 percent 
level, and *** denotes 1 percent level. 
The estimated coefficients in Table 18 reveal expenditure preference of 
budgetary revenues. As indicated by the magnitude of the coefficients, the 
expenditure priority of additional budgetary revenues follows the order of Capital 
Construction, Education, Administration, Police & Judicial Dep., Social Security, and 
Agriculture (by absolute effect).  More specifically, the coefficients in Table 18 imply 
that among one additional yuan (RMB) increase of budgetary revenue, 0.112 yuan 
goes to Capital Construction, 0.093 yuan to Education, 0.74 yuan to Administration, 
0.70 yuan to Police & Judicial Departments, 0.27 yuan to Social Security, 0.25 yuan 
to Agriculture, and 0.468 yuan to Miscellaneous. Nearly half of each dollar of 
budgetary revenues goes toward unspecified expenditure items (Miscellaneous 
expenditures), raising questions about fiscal management and supervision.  Put into 
comparable terms, I calculate elasticities to indicate the effect of budgetary revenues 
on expenditure items.  Elastisicities calculated from the coefficients in Table 18 show 
that a one percent increase in budgetary revenues will increase 1.42 percent of 
                                                 
60 I also use Seemingly Unrelated Regressions (SUR), which generated similar coefficients.  As SUR 
does not allow heteroskedasticity, and the cross-equation correlations may be largely captured by city 




expenditure on Capital Construction, which is the highest in six expenditure 
categories; 1.20 percent on Police and Judicial Departments; 0.85 percent on 
Administration; 0.70 percent on Education; 0.65 percent on Social Security; and 0.51 
percent on Agriculture, respectively.  Education, Social Security, and Agriculture are 
the least favored areas for any additional budgetary revenues.  
4.5.2 Do Off-budget Revenues Crowd out Budgetary Expenditure? 
Table 19 presents the OLS estimated results of equation (4) with two-way 
fixed effects.  Specific control variables to each expenditure items are included.  
Interpretation of the table implies the following findings with regard to key variables.  
First, budgetary revenues have a significant coefficient at the 0.01 level across cases 
and the magnitude of the coefficients tend to decline with control variables.  Second, 
land revenues do not have a significant coefficient for all budgetary expenditure 
items, even though half of the cases have the expected sign.  This leads to the 
conclusion that a crowding out effect of off-budget revenues is not statistically found.  
The robustness of this conclusion is tested through different estimators and the 
conclusion holds in general.61  
                                                 
61 I use the 2SLS and the GMM estimators with two-way fixed effects to test the robustness by treating 
land revenues to be endogenous.   The results change lightly for Capital Construction and 




Table 19: OLS Estimates of Equation (4) 
(1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2)
-0.0048 -0.0041 0.0005 0.0020 -0.0006 -0.0003 -0.0041 -0.002536 0.0020 0.0013656 -0.0038 -0.0033
(-0.22) (-0.20) (0.06) (0.28) (-0.14) (-0.07) (-1.09) (-0.97) (0.57) (0.36) (-0.73) (-0.64)
0.0631*** 0.0462* 0.0588*** 0.0334*** 0.0188*** 0.0198** 0.0510*** 0.0266*** 0.0481*** 0.0227*** 0.0154*** 0.0154***
(2.64) (1.78) (14.91) (6.09) (3.24) (2.57) (7.34) (6.70) (7.55) (4.86) (3.47) (5.93)
0.0034 0.0045*** -0.0004 0.0046*** 0.0048*** 0.0001
(0.79) (6.52) (-0.58) (5.18) (4.56) (0.16)
-0.1163 -0.0495 -0.0900* 0.001835 0.0738** -0.1128*



















R2 0.97 0.97 0.98 0.98 0.81 0.82 0.96 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.88 0.89
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rate in the 2nd 
AgricultureCapital Construction Education Social Security Administration
Police & Judicial 
Dep.
Notes: both city and year fixed effects are controlled.  Heteroskedasticity-robust t values are reported in the 
parenthesis.  * denotes significance at 10% level, ** denotes 5% level, and *** denotes 1% level. 
Control variables yield mixed results.  Per capita GDP is positively correlated 
with budgetary expenditures in Education, Administration, and Police & Judicial 
Departments at the 0.01 level.62  The coefficients imply that a one percent increase in 
per capita GDP is associated with 0.26 percent increase in budgetary expenditures on 
Education; 0.41 percent increase on Administration, and 0.63 percent increase on 
Police & Judicial Departments.   Population in general is not a factor affecting 
budgetary expenditure, except that it is correlated with budgetary expenditure in 
Police & Judicial Department at the margin.  Budgetary expenditure in Capital 
Construction is positively correlated with manufacturing GDP growth rate at 0.01 
                                                 




level, and the elasticity is as high as 0.88. Higher teacher/student ratio and larger 
student enrollment significantly increase budgetary expenditure in Education, as 
expected. The coefficients suggest that 0.21 percent and 0.38 percent increases in 
budgetary expenditure in Education are associated with a one percent increase in 
teacher/student ratio and a one percent increase in student enrollment, respectively. 
 Budgetary expenditure in Social Security increases with the ratio of retirees from the 
public sector over the total population.  The estimated coefficient shows that a one 
percent increase in the ratio of retirees over the total population is associated with 
0.34 percent increase in the budgetary expenditure in Administration. It is anticipated 
that police patrolling increases as masses of migrants from rural areas surge into 
cities.  Without good data on migrants and floating population, I use the population 
share in the city proper as a proxy that is positively correlated with budgetary 
expenditure in Police & Judicial Departments.  The estimation produces the expected 
results.  The estimated coefficient suggests that a one percent increase in the 
population share is associated with 0.25 percent increase in budgetary expenditure in 
Police & Judicial Departments. As expected, the share of agricultural population is 
positively corrected with budgetary expenditure in Agriculture.  The elasticity of 
agriculture population is 0.39. 
4.5.3 Size and Performance of Public Sector Activities and Land Revenues    
Since there is no categorized expenditure data available on off-budget 
revenues, I use an indirect approach to examine the associations between land 
revenues and the size or performance of public sector activities. That is, to regress 




revenues controlled by budgetary revenues and other variables specific to each type 
of public activities.  Dependent variables used to measure the size or performance of 
public sector activities are broken into two categories based on nature of financing. 
The first category requires reliable funding sources and is not expected to correlate 
with off-budget (here land) revenues. This category includes the number of school 
teachers, employment in governments and their branches, employment in public 
institutions, land for highways, and land for railroads.  Construction of highways and 
railroads has a much larger geographic area than the territory of city prefectures and 
requires financial commitment at a higher administrative level (provinces and the 
state).    The second and final category does not require reliable funding sources and 
can correlate with land revenues.  The measures in this category include urban paved 
roads, urban roads & public squares, land for inter-regional transport, land for rural 
roads, open space & parks, number of street lights, sewer length, sidewalk (areas), 
number of buses, library books, water pipeline, sewage treatment capacity, and land 
for public facilities.  I use the association between the size/performance of public 
sector activities and land revenue to implicitly suggest expenditure preferences and 
patterns of off-budget revenues. 63  A log-linear functional form is used for the 
estimations.  
Table 20 shows the estimated results on public sector’s activities that are not 
expected to correlate with land revenues.  As expected, land revenues do not have 
significant coefficients while budgetary revenues are only significant for employment 
in government branches, employment in public institutions, and land for rural roads. 
                                                 
63 The land for inter-regional transportation in urban proper mainly captures railway stations, bus 




Unexpectedly, the growth rate of schoolteachers is not associated with budgetary 
revenues.  This may suggest that education expenditure has not benefited from 
economic growth at the city level.  A close examination of the control variables 
reveals the following.  First, stock level variables in one year have a negative 
coefficient, implying that growth rates converge. Stock level variables have 
elasiticities ranging from -0.86 to -0.36.  Second, population has negative coefficients 
except one activity measure (employment in public institutions), implying that growth 
rates decrease with city size.  Third, per capita GDP has a positive correlation with 
the growth rate in land for highways, suggesting a positive relationship between GDP 
and highway development. The negative relationship between per capita GDP and 
employment in public institutions may be caused by privatization taking place in that 
period.  Fourth, and particularly to specific control variables, the growth rate of 
schoolteachers is associated positively with that of student enrollment; the growth 
rate of employment in public institutions is associated positively with the share of 




Table 20: The Size or Performance of Public Activities that Should Not Be 










Land for Rail 
Roads
Statistical Ara Whole city Whole city Whole city Whole city Whole city
-0.0004 -0.0037 -0.0098 0.0023 -0.0017
(-0.14) (-1.18) (-0.52) (0.82) (-0.55)
0.0122 0.1885* 0.3619** 0.0989*** 0.0172
(0.85) (1.87) (2.17) (2.61) (0.60)
-0.3472*** -0.5427*** -0.8608*** -0.4624*** -0.4659***
(-6.84) (-5.78) (-25.46) (-9.28) (-13.13)
0.0186 -0.0116 -0.3645* 0.1397*** 0.0068
(1.28) (-0.24) (-1.87) (2.89) (0.15)
-0.2720*** -0.4318*** 0.0719 -0.1848** -0.4216***
(-6.98) (-7.17) (0.17) (-2.12) (-9.38)
0.1864*** 0.1753*** 0.1499 0.1067 0.1170**









R2 0.52 0.44 0.50 0.42 0.55
Obs. 1798 1798 1706 1451 1398
Log (share of urbanized 
population)
Log (student growth rate)
Log growth rate of…
Log (land revenue)
Log (total budgetary rev)
Log (stock per capita last 
year)
Log (GDP per capita) 
Log (population) 
Log (pop. growth rate) 
past 3 years
Log (2nd industry share in 
GDP)
Log (3rd industry share in 
GDP)
 
Notes: both city and year fixed effects are controlled.  The heteroskedasticity-robust t values are 
reported in the parenthesis.  * denotes significance at 10% level, ** denotes 5% level, and *** denotes 
1% level. 
Table 21 shows the size or performance of public sector activities that are 
correlated with land revenues.  It shows that land revenues are positively correlated 
with urban paved roads, urban roads and public squares, interregional transportation, 
and open space and parks.  Surprisingly, budgetary revenues affect the growth rates 
of only urban paved road and open space and parks.  Budgetary revenues are less 
likely to be used to finance the development of public squares and land for 
interregional transport hubs.  The coefficients reveal that a one percent increase in 




roads, and inter-city transportation; and with a 0.038 percent increase in open space, 
suggesting that the impact of land revenues on the growth rates of those activity 
measures is significant.  The coefficient of budgetary revenues is significantly 
positive for urban paved roads and open space, but not significant for land for inter-
regional transport facilities.  Interestingly, elasticities of budgetary revenues are larger 
than elasticities of land revenues.  Stock level variables with a one-year lag all have a 
negative coefficient, implying a trend of convergence in those activity measures  
Population has negative coefficients, suggesting that smaller cities have larger growth 
rates, all other things being equal.  The growth rates of urban paved roads and urban 
paved roads & public squares are positively associated with the growth rate of 
population, respectively.  Specific variables to each type of activity measures show 
that the share of secondary GDP is positively associated with urban paved roads & 
public squares and land for inter-regional transport facilities while the share of the 
tertiary GPD is significant only for land used for inter-regional transport facilities.  





Table 21: The Size or Performance of Public Activities That are Correlated with 
Land Revenues 
Urban paved roads 
(area)
Urban roads & 
squares
Land used to 
facility inter-city 
transport
Open space and 
parks
Statistical Ara Urban proper Urban proper Urban proper Urban proper
0.0148** 0.0158** 0.0157* 0.0380***
(2.53) (2.41) (1.69) (2.68)
0.0770* 0.0802 -0.0622 0.1891*
(1.91) (1.52) (-1.00) (1.93)
-0.3552*** -0.2730*** -0.3652*** -0.5623***
(-7.79) (-4.23) (-6.93) (-8.31)
0.0397 -0.1308** -0.0138 -0.0166
(0.96) (-2.28) (-0.22) (-0.15)
-0.2617*** -0.2401*** -0.2571*** -0.3632***
(-5.32) (-3.36) (-2.76) (-4.10)
0.0610** 0.1121** 0.0662 0.0740







Obs. 1641 1610 1647 1723
R2 0.44 0.37 0.31 0.38
Log (share of urbanized 
population)
Log (land revenue)
Log (total budgetary rev)
Log (stock per capita last year)
Log (GDP per capita) 
Log growth rate of…
Log (population) 
Log (pop. growth rate) past 3 
years
Log (2nd industry share in GDP)
Log (3rd industry share in GDP)
 
Notes: both city and year fixed effects are controlled.  The heteroskedasticity-robust t values are 
reported in the parenthesis.  * denotes significance at 10% level, ** denotes 5% level, and *** denotes 
1% level. 
Table 22 shows the estimated results reporting uncorrelated size or 
performance of public sector activities with land revenues.  They include land for 
rural roads, street lights, sewer, number of buses, library books, water pipelines, 
sewage treatment capacity, and land for public facilities.  Insignificant coefficients 
suggest that those activity measures are unlikely to benefit from land revenues.  
Budgetary revenues have a positive and significant coefficient on all except water 
pipeline, sewage treatment capacity, and land for public facility.  Elasticities show 
that magnitude of budgetary revenues is relatively mild as they range from 0.10 to 




lumpiness nature of growth.  Consistent with previous tables, stock level variables in 
one year lag all have a negative coefficient, with elasticities of -0.77 – -0.49, while 
population has negative coefficients significantly for all but library books.  The 
population growth rate is positively correlated with that of buses.  A close 
examination of specific variables related to activity measures reveals that the growth 
rate of library books is positively correlated with the share of urbanized population; 
the growth rate of built-up areas is positively correlated with sewer and land for land 
for public facility; and growth rate of urban paved roads is positively correlated with 









































-0.0037 0.0144 0.0084 0.0089 0.0077 0.0104 -0.0113 0.0252 -0.0097
(-1.24) (1.43) (1.42) (0.85) (1.00) (1.10) (-0.78) (0.88) (-0.71)
0.0910** 0.2395*** 0.2509*** 0.1369** 0.0968** 0.3389*** 0.0629 0.2881 -0.0833
(2.02) (2.80) (2.97) (2.07) (2.05) (3.55) (1.00) (1.18) (-0.92)
-0.3596***-0.5228***-0.5534***-0.4881***-0.5077***-0.5886***-0.7672***-0.5820***-0.6246***
(-3.66) (-15.70) (-7.72) (-4.24) (-15.78) (-7.27) (-12.80) (-9.48) (-9.30)
-0.0356 0.0588 0.0210 0.1063 0.1342** 0.1276 0.0571 0.1133 -0.0051
(-0.71) (0.67) (0.36) (1.52) (2.42) (1.42) (0.59) (0.63) (-0.06)
-0.3499***-0.4663***-0.3751***-0.2915***-0.4236***-0.3987***-0.4752*** -0.6901 -0.3882***
(-4.51) (-7.41) (-5.70) (-3.15) (-8.56) (-3.82) (-6.92) (-5.76) (-5.01)
0.1204 0.0577 -0.0064 -0.0464 0.0899*** -0.0053 -0.0691* -0.0361 -0.0779













Obs. 1448 1628 1736 1628 1958 1749 1754 1240 1718
R2 0.33 0.40 0.37 0.38 0.43 0.39 0.41 0.41 0.37
Log (share of urbanized 
population)
Log (built-up area growth 
rate) past three years
Log (growth rate of paved 
road)
Log (student growth rate)
Log (land revenue)
Log (total budgetary rev)
Log (stock per capita last 
year)
Log (GDP per capita) 
Log growth rate of…
Log (population) 
Log (pop. growth rate) past 3 
years
Log (2nd industry share in 
GDP)
Log (3rd industry share in 
GDP)
Notes: both city and year fixed effects are controlled.  The heteroskedasticity-robust t values are reported in the 
parenthesis.  * denotes significance at 10% level, ** denotes 5% level, and *** denotes 1% level. 
4.6 Final Remarks and Conclusions 
Perhaps the increase of off-budget revenues is inevitable when local 
governments face tight fiscal constraint during fiscal decentralization.  Off-budget 
revenues bring in benefits and costs to local governments.  Benefits are associated 
with fiscal flexibility and fiscal capacity.  Fiscal flexibility is of great importance 




fiscal capacity is critical since local governments can promote economic growth 
through public expenditure.  The cost side of off-budget revenues is usually linked to 
mismanagement in public finance and abuse, fraud, and corruption.  
Although off-budget revenues have drawn a lot of attention, few studies on 
their expenditure preferences are available. This paper uses an indirect approach 
(regression models) to examine expenditure preferences and patterns.  The indirect 
approach is composed of a demand-supply type of model and statistical regression 
between land revenues and the size or performance of public activities of the public 
sector.  Based on estimated results using a panel data of 285 Chinese cities between 
1999 and 2006, I conclude the following.  First, a crowding out effect of off-budget 
revenues on budgetary expenditure is not found.  Second, the size or performance of 
public sector activities that require reliable financial sources are not correlated with 
land revenues, as expected.  Specifically, in this category land revenues from land 
sales and rents are volatile and are not likely used to finance schoolteachers, 
employment in government branches, employment in public institutions, and inter-
regional transportation (such as highways and railroads).  Third, the size or 
performance of public sector activities that do not require reliable finance sources are 
not necessarily correlated with land revenues.  Some do and others do not.  Land 
revenues are more likely spent on urban paved roads, public squares, open space, and 
land for inter-regional transport facilities while land revenues are not likely spent on 
library books, buses, sewer, and sewage treatment capacity. The former can be 
viewed as image (or high profile) projects that can make local officials look good 




visible.  Given limited measures in the size or performance of public sector activities, 
land revenues tend to be spent on basic infrastructure and physical improvement on 
urban environment that are tangible as a part of a local economic development 
strategy while there is a tendency to ignore the needs of human capital (education) 
and less visible infrastructure (sewer and sewage treatment).    
Recognizing the potential risk associated with dominant off-budget activities 
and related issues and challenges, Chinese governments have begun to experiment 
with reforms.  Policy initiatives like introducing a property tax in cities of Shanghai 
and Chongqing in 2011, allowing to some cities to experiment with local government 
issued bonds in 2011 and moving land revenues into a budgetary management 
scheme are moves in the right direction.  However, these actions alone are not 
enough.  A comprehensive and more rapid reform in the fiscal and tax system, 
including fiscal relationships between the central and subnational governments and 
among subnational governments is urgently needed.  The comprehensive fiscal and 
tax reform should include, though not be limited to, property taxation, land revenues, 
and local bonds.  More specifically, the property tax should be rapidly expanded as a 
substitute to land revenues, whose dominance should be diminished, if not completely 
phrased out.  Land revenues should be channeled into land funds whose expenditure 
should be spread across multiple years and into projects that benefit social welfare 





Chapter 5:  Conclusions 
 The three related essays in this dissertation contribute to the understanding of 
urban development.  I find significant effects of employment centers on economic 
development, strong impact from labor market bust to housing market depression, 
and different spending preferences between on-budget and off-budget revenues in 
local governments. 
 The first essay in Chapter 2 concludes that employment centers foster 
agglomeration economies.  From inside to outside centers, urbanization effects 
decline by 51% - 245% and localization effects decline by 58% - 87%.  It implies 
that, if centers are omitted, the conventional method of using fixed distance in 
estimating agglomeration effects may suffer from potential bias.  I also find that the 
effects of employment centers are affected by their characteristics such as size and 
industrial diversity.  Large or diverse centers tend to generate more new firms than 
small or specialized ones.  These findings provide prominent policy implications, that 
in order to encourage local economic growth, planners and policy makers should 
favor the development of employment centers, particularly those with large sizes or 
high diversities. 
 The second essay in Chapter 3 finds that job loss largely increases housing 
foreclosures.  I present the significant spatial separation between workplace and 
residence, which generally hinders the studies of interactions between labor and 
housing markets.  In order to overcome this challenge, I use the commute data at 




vulnerability index for each residential neighborhood.  After correcting the 
attenuation bias from measurement errors, I conclude that a one percent increase in 
the job loss index increases foreclosures in corresponding residential neighborhoods 
by about 0.85 percent.  This finding provides evidence for the so-called trigger 
events, and is different from the traditional literature that use state or county level 
unemployment rate and report mixed results on the effect of job loss.  I also provide 
evidence for the interactions between labor market and local housing markets.  The 
policy implication is that, the efforts in stabilizing local labor market and reducing 
layoffs may help reduce housing foreclosures.  
The third essay in Chapter 4 studies the spending behaviors of off-budget 
revenues.  The literature hypothesizes that governments tend to spend off-budget 
revenues differently from the way they spend budgetary revenues.  But the data on 
off-budget activities is hard to collect to test this hypothesis.  I use land revenues to 
proxy the off-budget revenues in Chinese cities.  I find that off-budget funds do not 
crowd out budgetary expenditures.  I also find off-budget revenues tend to support 
those public goods that are more visible and tangible, in my research including urban 
paved roads, public squares, open space, and inter-regional transport facilities.  
Different from budgetary revenues, off-budget revenues do not support some 
important but not quite obvious public goods such as library books, buses, sewers, 
etc.  These findings raise concerns over the budgetary control and spending behaviors 





Appendix A: Marginal Effects in Tobit Model with Interaction Terms 
In a model with left censoring or corner solution at Y=0, and assume the 
residual u has normal distribution N(0, σ2).  The model is: 
nn xxxXBY   ...2211
*  and I observe Y=Y* if Y*≥0; Y=0 if Y*<0.  Then 
it is easy to show that ),/()/()|(  XBXBXBXYE  and the marginal effect 
of xi is Φ(XB/σ)*βi, where Φ(·) represents the standard normal cumulative density 
function, (·) is the standard normal probability function, and σ is the standard 
deviation of the residual.  When an interaction term x1x2 is added, I have 
nn xxxxxXBY   ...21122211












which depends on not only β1 but also 
β12, x2 as well as Φ(XB/σ).  After some directives and transformations, the marginal 





























XYE   if x2 is a dummy, 
which depends on not only β12, but also β1, β2, x2, σ, and Φ(XB/σ).  It at least suggests 
three points.  First, the interaction effect could be nonzero even if β12=0.  Second, the 
significance of the interaction effect and β12 are not necessarily consistent.  Third, the 




marginal effects of agglomerative effects inside/outside centers in Table 5.  The 
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